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More than 70 years after the enactment of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) the topic of human rights 
remains one of tension in international relations. Countries are 
trying to find a compromise between complying with human 
rights and economic benefits in foreign policy. As a traditional 
human rights advocate, the Netherlands has experienced what 
happens if they fail to do so as it suffered political retribution 
from China in the 1990s. Due to the tension between adherence 
to ideals and economic considerations not all parties may 
evaluate them equally. This study aims at analysing party level 
differences between their focus on human rights when raising 
China-related issues and party responses to changes in Dutch 
Chinese-human rights policies. Through analyses based on 
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party behaviour theories regarding parliamentary questions (PQ) 
and theories regarding the Western perceptions of China’s rise 
this study concludes that parties have dissimilar motivations for 
their behaviour. Christian Parties were shown to utilize human 
rights as a political tool. These parties did so by focusing on only 
the religious freedom of Christians in parliamentary debates, 
whereas other parties also focused on other human rights 
concerns. Coalition parties were found to decrease their 
adherence to human rights as relations with China became more 
complex and multifaceted. Finally, opposition parties were found 
to react to issues of salience and changes in human rights 
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Frequently used abbreviations 
 
AIV Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Eng: Advisory 
Council on International Affairs 
CDA  Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Eng: Christian Democratic 
Appeal) 
CU  Christen Unie (Eng: Christian Union) 
D66  Democraten 66 (Eng: Democrats ’66) 
HTK  Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Eng: Proceedings Second 
Chamber) 
MP  Member of Parliament 
PQ  Parliamentary Question 
PvdA  Partij van de Arbeid (Eng: Labour Party) 
PvdD  Partij van de Dieren (Animal Party) 
PVV  Partij voor de Vrijheid (Eng: Party for Freedom) 
SGP  Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Eng: Reformed 
Political Party) 
VVD  Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Eng: People’s 
party for Freedom and Democracy)  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Study Background 
The fundamental human rights inherent to all human beings sit as one of 
the cornerstones in the international framework. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed on the 10th of December 1948, 
remains a milestone document in its history and, with versions in more than 
500 languages, is the single most translated document in the world.1 Its 
widespread reading and implementation are due to the international 
relations’ movement away from bilateral and towards multilateral 
constructions. Since the establishment of these modern multilateral 
constructs, Europe has taken upon the role of a normative power in 
international relations. The EU itself was founded on the principles of 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Multilateral institutions gave 
a stronger voice to smaller countries and enforced a system of adherence 
to international norms and standards set by these institutions. 
 In this framework, the Netherlands considers itself a frontrunner 
when it comes to human rights. The Dutch government prefers multilateral 
solutions to human rights issues but is also extensively engaged with 
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relevant countries to improve their domestic human rights situations 
through development cooperation.2 However, a policy letter regarding the 
foreign policy of the Netherlands towards China in 2019 contained a 
startling new realisation: influence works both ways.3 For the first time, a 
Dutch policy letter concluded that a foreign actor could affect the state of 
human rights domestically. It was concluded to be no longer a certainty that 
the Netherlands influenced China only unilaterally. 
 This realisation has potentially far-reaching consequences. The 
rise of China as an increasingly important actor in world politics and its 
implications has been part of both the political and the academic debate.4 
China’s rise is not a threat simply due to its economic, political and 
geographical size by itself, but because it puts into question a core belief 
regarding the norms and values established in the current international 
world order: universality. Many Western nations believed that any country 
developing far enough would inevitably adhere to norms and values similar 
to those of the Western states’ themselves. Thus, it was believed that 
introducing China into the international framework would lead to Chinese 
reforms and adaptations to the existing international systems of law. This, 
however, does not completely seem to be the case. There are currently still 
                                                          
2
 States General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Mensenrechtenrapportage 2018: Inzet en 
resultaten buitenlands mensenrechtenbeleid”. 2018: 1- 105. (Eng: Human Rights Report 
2018: Input and results foreign human rights policy.) 
3
 States General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Nederland-China: Een Nieuw Balans’. 2019: 
1-105. (Eng: Netherlands-China: A New Balance). 
4
 Influential writers include Graham T Allison, John Ikenberry, John Mearsheimer, and 
Joshua Cooper Ramo. 
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many disputed cases regarding trade with China, despite its entry to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.5 Similarly, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) prevented Taiwan from attending WHO meetings and 
events after 2016 due to pressure from China.6 Finally, China was amongst 
the chief authors of the UDHR which it signed. Nonetheless reports of the 
oppression of (religious) minorities, the institutionalized forced harvesting of 
organs, and the persecution of human and/or civil rights activists are 
continuous causes for alarm to the Netherlands and other human rights 
advocates. 
 Like many Western democracies, the Netherlands is ambivalent 
towards China as a global partner. China has grown to be an economic 
world power that offers many economic opportunities. Scrutinizing Chinese 
human rights may be to the detriment of bilateral economic relations. China 
has retaliated in the past by cutting off economic cooperation with countries 
that focused too much, or at least too publicly, on human rights issues. The 
Netherlands itself experienced this in 1997 after it attempted to pass 
multiple EU resolutions that criticized Chinese human rights in the 
European Commission of Human Rights. The resolutions failed to gain a 
majority during the voting stage. As a consequence, diplomatic and 
                                                          
5
 World Trade Organization. “China and the WTO”. 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm Accessed: 25-5-2020. 
6
 Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen. “Why Does the WHO Exclude Taiwan.” Council of 




economic ties between the Netherlands and China were frozen by China 
for a year.7 
 This issue poses an apparent gap between economics and 
idealism. Adhering to moral ideals endangers economic relations, but 
dropping human rights issues in favour of economics means foregoing the 
foundations on which countries like the Netherlands built their political 
identity as well as the adhering concepts of universality. 
1.2. Purpose of Research 
The Dutch relationship with China consists of balancing economic 
considerations versus those of ideals. The comparison, however, may be 
lopsided. In the 2017 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) the 
‘Economic/Financial situation’ was considered the 4th most important issue, 
whereas ‘human rights’ was not on the list.8 Economics is of higher political 
implication than are those of human rights. As human rights can hinder 
economic relations, it gives incentives to governments to forego them in 
favour of economics. This raises the questions on whether there are 
differences between parties regarding their adherence to human rights 
advocacy. 
                                                          
7
 Malcontent & Huijboom (2006): 53 – 66. 
8
 Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey. “Most important national problem”. 2017. The 
Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) is the single largest survey regarding voting 
behaviour in the Netherlands. Human rights could hypothetically be placed under ‘foreign 





To measure these party behaviours one must look at the tools that 
parties have at their disposal. In the Dutch parliamentary system, there is 
one core tool through which parties can partake in policy debates: 
parliamentary questioning. Parliamentary questions (PQs) are the main 
method by which a member of parliament (MP) can ask a Minster of the 
government regarding any topic that the relevant Minister is in charge of.9 
MPs can field questions during any plenary session. PQs are the main 
method for an MP to gain information and/or scrutinize government actions 
and this tool is utilized daily.10  
My initial reading of all China-related PQs and their proportion of 
those related to human rights issues shows that not all parties are equally 
invested in inquiring about human rights.11  Specifically, although larger 
parties tend to ask more PQs overall, some smaller parties seem to be 
more heavily invested in human rights than others. These parties include 
the SGP, CU, RPF, GPV, and DENK. Aside from DENK, such a peculiar 
reaction is particularly intriguing and puzzling because these parties adhere 
to what is called ‘confessionalism,’ a form of party politics in which values 
                                                          
9
 Lower House of the States General. Rules of Procedure. “Chapter XI. Requests to the 
government for information”. 
https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/180626-
reglement_van_orde_engels.pdf. Accessed 24-5-2020. 
10
 In 2019 alone a total of 7399 parliamentary questions were raised by MPs in the Lower 
House. 
Lower House in the States General. “Kamervragen periode 01-01-2019 – 31-12-2019”. 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen?&fromdate=01-01-
2019&todate=31-12-2019. Accessed 24-5-2020; Norton (1993). 
11
 See Appendix nr. 1. 
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from the New Testament form the basis of the party’s political identity.12 Yet 
their fundamentalist religious perspective outrightly contradicts a core 
principle of human rights that all individuals are equal. The RPF and GPV 
were against women’s right to vote until their merger into the CU in as 
recently as 2003 and the SGP has only allowed female candidates since 
2013. In other words, these parties that denied their Dutch women the 
fundamental political rights of freedom in expression are seemingly more 
concerned with human rights in a remote country like China. Do these 
parties simply believe that they uphold their ‘Christian values’ by raising 
questions over human rights in China or are there any political values 
attached to their parliamentary behaviour? It begs the question of why 
certain parties would put more focus on human rights than others. 
The goal of this research is therefore to 1) show whether the 
Chinese human rights policies of the Netherlands fluctuate between 
coalition governments that put different emphasis on human rights policy 
and 2) analyse party level characteristics to determine whether they can 
explain party variations in human rights-oriented behaviour. 
This research intends to answer the following research question: 
What causes some Dutch parties to focus more on human rights issues in 
the Netherlands-China relations than others? Furthermore, through an 
analysis of party level characteristics can human rights be considered any 
different from other topics on international relations with China? 
                                                          
12
 See Appendix nr. 2 for a list of all parties and their self-proclaimed ideologies. 
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The idea for this dissertation came from two fields of academic 
research. The first of these are the studies conducted regarding party 
behaviour in parliamentary systems. A variety of academic research has 
developed several theoretical explanations to determine when and why 
parties raise questions in parliamentary debates. The theoretical 
background that these works provide forms a solid basis for analysing the 
China-related PQs obtained for this dissertation. The second field of 
literature analyses the history of the Netherlands as a human rights 
advocate. These literary works discuss not only human rights policy but 
also those specifically towards China. However, there are gaps in both 
works of literature. The studies on PQs have so far concentrated on overall 
tendencies rather than specific political topics. It is unlikely that MPs 
approach all topics in politics equally. By applying these theories to the PQs 
collected it becomes possible to determine whether human rights centric 
PQs are based on the same political tendencies established in theories as 
other topics or if they are distinctly different. Second, the literature 
regarding Dutch human rights policies regarding China has only focused on 
the policies themselves. Therefore the literature assumes a uniformity of 
the Dutch government as a singular actor. This means that the literature is 
therefore focused on the state level. Yet, the preliminary reading of party-
level PQ compositions revealed significant variations amongst parties. 
Explaining these variances at the party-level is important because it can 




 The purpose of this research is therefore to help in further the 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in human rights as a topic in 
Dutch foreign policy and analyse the reasons that underlie existing and 
prior policies. This study has therefore significance due to the Netherlands’ 
important role in international relations as a human rights advocate. 
1.3. Confessionalism in Dutch politics 
Although the Netherlands is currently considered relatively secular, 
society was heavily segregated based on religious and political identity until 
the 1960s. This period of politico-denominational segregation in Dutch 
society was named the pillarisation. The term pillarisation is derived from 
the analogy that each of the four social groups – protestant, catholic, 
socialist, and liberal – make up one of the four ‘pillars’ on which society 
rests. This segregation of society went as far as each pillar having their 
own social institutions ranging from broadcasting organizations to sports 
clubs.13 Although the pillarisation of Dutch society does no longer exist as 
such, many institutions have their origin in one of these four pillars. 
 There are several parties that have their roots within a singular 
pillar. This holds especially true for those of protestant nature. In current 
politics, the SGP and CU are the two parties left that adhere to the 
confessional politics of Protestantism. These are the SGP, the oldest party 
in the Netherlands, and the CU who did not exist until 2001 but was a 
                                                          
13
 Other institutions included schools, political parties, labour parties and farmers’ 
organisations, newspapers and hospitals. 
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founded as a merger between the older, protestant GPV and RPF.14 The 
third remaining Christian party is the CDA. Rather than being a remnant of 
the pillarisation period, the CDA was formed as a ‘depillarisation’ effort by 
the Protestant ARP and CHU and the Catholic KVP. These three parties 
merged to form the CDA, which adhered to the concept of ecumenism. 
Ecumenism is derived from Greek, meaning “the whole inhabited world”.15 
In essence, this can be seen as a striving for worldwide religious unity of all 
Christian churches. Ecumenism promotes unity, cooperation or mutual 
understanding between the various religious groups or denominations 
within a religion. 
 The CDA’s origin of multiple pillars might have caused the CDA to 
be inherently different from the SGP and CU. Confessional attachment was 
shown to be strongly correlated to electoral behaviour in the 1970s.16 
However, the secularization of Dutch society has brought about changes in 
this electoral behaviour. The CDA’s electorate has become increasingly 
secular, whereas the SGP and CU’s electorates have remained highly 
religious.17 The CDA’s current views on abortion, euthanasia, and LGBTQ+ 
                                                          
14
 The RPF itself was founded by conservative members of the ARP in 1975. 
15
 Dictionary.com, ‘ecumenical’. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ecumenical. 
Accessed: 17-6-2020. 
16
 Miller, W. E., & Stouthard, P. C. (1975). Confessional attachment and electoral 
behavior in the Netherlands. European Journal of Political Research, 3(3), 219-258. 
17
 Konig, R. (2013). Seculariseren de achterbannen van de confessionele partijen 
mee? Veranderingen in het gedachtegoed van de aanhang van politieke partijen in 
Nederland in de periode van 1979 tot 2012. Ontkerkelijking, nou en…? Oorzaken 
en gevolgen van secularisatie in Nederland. 
10 
 
rights also put it at odds with the SGP and CU.18 Thus, the CDA should be 
considered as separate from the traditional confessional parties of the SGP 
and CU. 
 Voters for these confessional parties are often found in what is 
considered the ‘Dutch bible-belt’, stretching out from the south-west to the 
eastern part of the Netherlands. Outside of this belt, SGP typically receives 
less than 1 percent of all votes in municipalities. The municipalities that 
make up much of the SGP’s constituency are typically made up of smaller, 
rural communities who have not increasingly become more secular and 
progressive as the rest of the Netherlands. As such they are considered to 
be a highly conservative party by modern standards. As the preliminary 
data shows, these parties may play a significant role regarding the human 
rights debate in Dutch-China relations. 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
 To answer the research question this introduction is followed up by 
six more chapters. Theories regarding party behaviour are discussed in 
chapter 2. These theories will form the theoretical framework upon which 
this study is based. Chapter 3 discusses the development and changes in 
Dutch human rights policies in regards to China. In chapter 4 I use the 
theories discussed in chapter 2 to develop measureable variables through 
which party behaviour can be analysed. Through a statistical analysis, 
                                                          
18
 CDA. ‘abortus’. https://www.cda.nl/standpunten/abortus; ‘euthenasia’ 
https://www.cda.nl/standpunten/euthanasie. Accessed: 17-6-2020. 
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chapter 5 discusses party behaviour through the usage of chapter 2 and 4. 
Chapter 6 contains a qualitative content analysis on party behaviour in 
response to government policies through the theories of chapter 2 and the 
policy periods illustrated in chapter 3. Finally, chapter 7 concludes the 
research with a reflection of the results, their implications and suggestions 




Chapter 2. On when parties question ministers 
 
To acquire a better understanding of party behaviours in the Dutch-Chinese 
relationship, it is essential to recognize the political deliberations that 
determine these behaviours. Therefore, this chapter presents four theories 
relevant to explaining when and why parties field PQs in parliamentary 
systems. These theoretical frameworks position parliamentary questioning 
through the scopes of elections, control, constituencies, and media 
influence. The chapter concludes with an analysis of these party behaviour 
theories’ expected relevance to human rights PQs. 
2.1. Parliamentary questioning literature 
2.1.1 Electoral tool theory 
Determined to boost their odds of re-election, parliamentarians, or 
MPs, are inherently motivated to make use of various electoral tools. In a 
democratic context, this means that an MP has to secure its spot both 
within his/her own party and by convincing constituents to vote in his/her 
favour. In addition, parliamentary questions are argued to be an efficient 
electoral tool by targeting the incumbent government. By raising PQs 
specifically aiming at the ruling party or coalition, MPs hope that their 
political tactics will convince the prospective constituents to vote for them 
as a viable and ultimately sole alternative to the incumbent government on 
13 
 
an election day. Accordingly, scholars argue that such parliamentary 
behaviour is specifically prevalent for parties that share similar constituents. 
MPs may focus their attention on issues that they believe are more 
likely to convince constituents to vote for them rather than their electoral 
opponents. This would mean that PQs are asked because of their ability to 
change voting behaviour.19 This electoral vulnerability can be present at 
both party- and individual-levels. 
The re-election incentive for individual legislators is only present in 
the setting of personalised electoral systems, such as single-member 
constituencies or a strong preference vote.20 The Dutch political system 
strictly speaking does contain a personalised element in the electoral 
system, however, there is an almost complete absence of strong 
preference voting amongst Dutch voters. In the Netherlands, a candidate 
with preferred votes is elected if he or she has obtained at least 25% of the 
electoral quota, and the lowest ranking candidate who would have been 
assigned a seat has fewer preference votes. However, preference voting 
has been shown to have virtually no impact with less than 1% of candidates 
receiving a spot due to preference voting in elections between 1978 and 
2010.21 Because these incentives for individual legislators are not present, 
the theory of PQs being used as an electoral tool for individual MPs is 
unlikely to fit with the Dutch political system. 
                                                          
19
 Kellermann (2016): p. 91. 
20
 Alemán et al. (2009): p. 89; Bräuninger et al (2012): pp. 612-613. 
21
 Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012):p. 186.  
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Considering the non-impact of preference voting in the Netherlands, 
are individual MPs’ desires for re-election than a non-factor for determining 
parliamentary questions? Although the direct individual incentive through 
preference voting is absent, this does not necessarily mean that there is no 
larger electoral incentive at play. At the party-level, parties are always in a 
tug-of-war for receiving more votes than their direct opponents. Like many 
European parliamentary systems, the Netherlands has many parties with 
often overlapping constituencies. Convincing voters to vote for your party 
therefore also becomes the issue of making alternative parties less 
attractive. Parliamentary questions can be used in this way to expose 
government or party mistakes.22 
The research found that in the Netherlands “parties are more likely 
to ask questions of ministers from parties that are ideologically distant and 
parties that are electorally similar”.23  
Ideological distance is the measurement of how dissimilar the policy 
lines of various parties are from one another. It seems to be an obvious 
observation that ideological distance has a positive correlation with the 
amount of PQs they ask. After all, questioning the government’s actions 
and policies is generally the job of the opposition which is inherently more 
likely to be more ideologically distant than parties within the same coalition 
government. Thus the average ideological distance is expected to be 
higher for opposition rather than coalition parties. 
                                                          
22
 Kellermann (2016): pp. 100-101. 
23
 Otjes & Louwerse (2018): pp. 509-510. 
15 
 
Electoral similarity may seem to be a measurement in direct 
opposition of ideological distance. Parties with similar ideologies are 
expected to share similar electorates. However, in multiparty parliamentary 
settings, these two measurements do not share a perfect negative 
correlation per se. This is because in the Netherlands voting behavior is 
partially determined by a person’s social class rather than strictly by a 
certain political programmatic adherence. For instance, the Christian-
Democratic Appeal has a left-right position similar to that of the social-
liberal Democrats 66, but whilst the Christian democrats’ voters are 
overwhelmingly religious, the voters’ of the Democrats 66 were 
predominantly secular.24 Thus, since the Christian-Democratic Appeal and 
the Democrats 66 are neither ideologically distant nor electorally similar it is 
expected that MPs from these parties are less likely to ask parliamentary 
questions directed towards one another.25 
 Parliamentary questions as an electoral tool are used in 
parliamentary democracies both by parties and individual MPs. However, 
due to the Dutch political system, individual incentives for using 
parliamentary questions for re-election are virtually non-existent. The 
ideological distance between parties may be a factor but can just as well be 
caused by the parties in question being the opposition on the one hand and 
in the coalition on the other. Finally, electoral similarity may be of particular 
interest when it cannot be explained by opposition or coalition politics. We 
                                                          
24
 CBS (2012). 
25
 Otjes & Louwerse (2018): p. 511. 
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expect opposition parties to ask more PQs because they are more likely to 
be ideologically distant as well as have a political interest in scrutinizing the 
government. Electoral similarity and ideological distance are likely to 
partially explain the effect either have on party behavior regarding PQs. 
2.1.2. Control tool theory 
The usage of parliamentary questions as a control tool is perhaps 
the most accepted interpretation. Control here refers to the ability to check 
the government, not the power to influence or command. This interpretation 
seems so self-evident simply because the Dutch government itself states it 
as a method of checking up on government. 26  However, it would be 
presumptuous to conclude that that is all there is to it. After all, 
parliamentary questions may have been envisioned as a tool of inquiry, but 
this does not mean that MPs don’t use it with other purposes in mind. 
 If parliamentary questions were a tool of checking the government 
they would have only been utilized by opposition parties, yet this is not the 
case. Coalition parties also ask parliamentary questions to one another to 
monitor each other’s behaviour.27 The literature argues that this is due to a 
fundamental delegation problem of coalition governments. Since coalition 
governments consist of multiple parties with non-identical policy ideologies, 
there is a necessity for coalition parties to ensure that all partners adhere to 
joint policy decisions of the cabinet even though these decisions are 
                                                          
26
 Lower House of The States General. ‘Zo werkt de Tweede Kamer’. 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/zo-werkt-de-kamer. Accessed: 12-4-2020. 
27
 Martin & Vanberg (2011). 
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implemented by MPs from individual parties.28 According to this theory, 
coalition partners are more likely to ask each other questions on areas of 
policy contention.29 Coalition members are less likely to divert from agreed-
upon policies if the policies agreed upon were based on values shared by 
all coalition parties. However, if a policy is determined to diverge from one 
or more of the parties’ personal preference then the need emerges for the 
other coalition parties to ensure that the policies are fulfilled according to 
the coalition agreement. 
If PQs are indeed used as a control tool of coalition governments, it 
is expected that the higher ideological distance, the more likely parties are 
to ask PQs. This is because parties with higher ideological distance from 
one another might ‘divert’ more from agreed-upon policy than a coalition 
formed from parties that are ideologically more similar to one another. Thus 
‘ideological distance’ has more than one interpretation. If ideological 
distance’s relationship with the likelihood of raising PQs can be significantly 
explained by whether or not the questions are asked by coalition parties it 
would favour the interpretation that PQs are fielded as a way of control, 
rather than as an electoral tool. However, if ideological distance and 
electoral overlap share a positive correlation with the likelihood of raising 
PQs it would favour the interpretation that PQs are used as an electoral tool, 
rather than a mechanism for control by coalition parties. 
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2.1.3. Constituency oriented behaviour theory 
The constituency oriented behavior of representatives refers to the 
actions undertaken by politicians in order to appeal to those who voted for 
him/her or their party. MPs that engage in this behavior will have to put in 
significant time and effort, even if it does not contribute much to their own 
agenda. 30  An MP may choose to do so regardless because the MP 
believes it may create a steady group of constituents, which would benefit 
the MP’s career in the long term.31 From this perspective, constituency 
oriented behavior and the electoral tool argument seem similar if not 
identical. After all, both ultimately have the same objectives: increasing the 
number of seats their party occupies in parliament from the party’s 
perspective and increasing one’s own political standing and likelihood of re-
election from an individual’s perspective. However, as described in the 
discussion regarding the electoral tool, individual re-election incentives are 
absent in the Netherlands. 
It is undeniable that there is a certain amount of overlap in 
reasoning between PQs through constituency oriented behavior theory and 
electoral tool theory. However, there are differences. First, the electoral tool 
focuses on utilizing questions as a way to criticize governments or coalition 
parties and possibly ‘steal away’ voters from them. Constituency oriented 
behavior instead focuses on asking questions on topics that their 
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constituency may deem important. It is not meant as a way of potentially 
gaining more voters but as a means of securing those that have already 
voted for them. Second, the usage of parliamentary questions as an 
electoral tool has been found to be influenced by the salience of an issue. 
That is to say, if a certain issue is of higher interest in society and media, it 
is more likely to lead to parliamentary questions aimed at the electoral 
competition. The reasoning behind it is that actions regarding the electoral 
competition are more effective when it is about an issue that is actively in 
the minds of the electorate. However, in the case of constituency oriented 
behaviour, the issues’ salience is not the main determinant. Parliamentary 
questions regarding this theme should theoretically still be asked even if the 
theme itself is a non-issue in public discourse because it is an underlying 
value of the electorate. 
This means that constituency oriented behaviour by parties is 
difficult to measure. Unless the part is a ‘one issue’ party, each party may 
have their own understanding of what their constituents would value. No 
existing research has tried to establish this relationship statistically. 32 
However, Vliegenthart (2013) argues that the content of PQs may offer 
some explanation. Regulations for fielding PQs in the Dutch parliament 
require MPs to include a reference on which their question is based. Most 
commonly, this is based on a (digital) newspaper article. In the case that 
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the reference used does not belong to a mainstream medium, but to one 
belong to a specific type of voter, it can be argued that those PQs are 
constituency oriented behaviour. However, there must be a clear 
connection between the party’s identity and that of the reference in order 
for proper inference to be made. 
2.1.4 Agenda-setting theory 
The final prevailing theory regarding PQs is regarding outside 
influences on parliamentary questioning. It questions whether what is seen 
in the media influences what politics talks about.33 This theory, called the 
agenda-setting theory, believes that news media have the ability to 
“influence the importance place on the topics of the public agenda”.34 The 
existence of this so-called ‘political agenda-setting effect’ of the mass 
media has been defended by various researchers across a wide variety of 
countries.35 However, the strength of this effect varied widely per study.36 It 
is argued that the type of medium plays a role: newspapers have more 
influence on the parliamentary agenda than televised news. The role of 
news content is also claimed to play a role: ‘bad news’ is argued to have a 
larger chance of attracting political attention than ‘good news’.37 Some 
political actors are reasoned to be more prone to media influence. 
Opposition party members have been argued to react more to the media 
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than ruling party members.38 Finally, the perceived importance of a topic 
(salience) was shown to have an impact through both mainstream media 
and conventional public salience, arguing that although media has an 
impact it is determined by a baseline of public sentiment.39 
In close relation to this theory is that of the Framing theory. This 
theory describes the way in which information is presented. Its core 
premise is that issues have dimensions of perspective. Any issue can be 
viewed from a multitude of perspectives.40 Dennis Chong and James N. 
Druckman (2007) stated that “framing refers to the process by which people 
develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or to reorient their 
thinking about an issue.”41  Therefore framing in news media is argued to 
occur when certain issues are reported from particular angles only. Framing 
theory has been applied in a wide variety of political research. Members of 
political parties were found to frame issues in a way that favours their own 
political leaning’s solutions. 42  Various researches have shown that 
respondents answer very differently on questionnaires depending on what 
prefaces are given as context.43 It has also been shown that the media 
framing of conflicts influences political action more than regular news and 
that immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands became more 
heated after news media adapted to framing immigration as a ‘Muslim 
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threat’. 44  In conclusion, the agenda-setting effect occurs when the 
information presented through certain framing influences the consumers of 
this information. 
2.2 Human rights and party behaviour. 
Theories of party behaviour regarding PQs explain general 
tendencies when analysing the usage of PQs in its entirety. They do not, 
however, explain whether or not these theories are appropriate for every 
topic discussed in politics. This part analyses the theories and their 
expected role in explaining variances in parties’ focus on human rights. 
PQs as an electoral tool have the potential of utilizing any political 
issue. This means that electoral overlap and electoral vulnerability may 
explain why a party would ask more questions towards another party, but it 
cannot explain when and why a party would proportionately ask more 
questions regarding human rights specifically. If the likelihood of asking 
human rights questions is positively linked to electoral overlap it may imply 
that parties believe that they can win voters over by focusing on failings by 
the government on human rights issues. If the likelihood of asking human 
rights questions is negatively linked to electoral overlap it may imply that 
parties believe human rights are less likely to convince voters. Considering 
that foreign policy, and especially human rights, was not part of any of the 
participating parties’ campaigns during the elections in 2012 and 2017 it is 
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unlikely that human rights have much of an impact on voting behavior. 
Ideological distance, however, could be an explanatory factor. Parties that 
are more ideologically distant from each other have naturally more issues 
on which they disagree with one another. There is also a strategic 
component to explain why parties might refrain from questioning 
ideologically close parties. It might be counter-productive to provoke an 
ideological proximate party with whom one shares little electoral overlap. 
The reason is that because these ideologically proximate parties may be 
potential government partners in the future.45 Potentially weakening their 
election results may result in an inability to create a majority coalition 
government with ideologically similar parties. 
 The theory of PQs as a control tool of coalition governments has 
the possibility of being of influence. There have been instances where 
rather ideologically distant parties have formed coalitions and asking 
human rights related PQs may be used as a tool to confirm that the 
Netherlands’ stance on human rights towards China adheres to the 
standards set by the coalition. If this is the case, coalition members are 
more likely to ask human rights-related questions if their ideological 
distance is larger. This might also explain the VVD’s considerably low 
percentage of human rights-related questions. Human rights questions are 
predominantly asked to the minister of foreign affairs, a seat that’s been 
held by a VVD or ideologically close CDA member for most of the time 
period. If the policy of foreign affairs decided on is similar to the ideology of 
                                                          
45
 Hansen & Pedersen (2008): 21; Walter (2014): 3. 
24 
 
the minister of foreign affairs that has to implement these policies, then 
there is little reason for a coalition partner to question whether or not that 
minister is implementing the policies as agreed upon. 
 Human rights related-questions as part of constituency-oriented 
behavior have the possibility to explain some of the variations found in the 
initial data gathering. Particularly of interest is the religious parties’ focus on 
human rights-related questions. If the data shows a significant positive 
correlation that a party with a heavily religious constituency is more likely to 
ask human rights-related questions, it begs the question as to why this is 
the case. Qualitative content analysis of those PQs becomes more 
important to properly explain whether this is a causal relationship. 
 Finally, the discussion of PQs as a result of agenda-setting needs 
to be discussed. Literature focusing on the agenda-setting power of the 
media does so in a linear manner: what is the likelihood that a news article 
is followed up by a PQ? This line of thought is prevalent in most of the 
literature available.46 Although this thesis does not deny the existence of an 
agenda-setting effect of news media – the causality was often proven 
significantly positive – the relationship is usually weak with only five percent 
or less of news articles resulting in PQs. Furthermore, this effect might 
explain why such topics receive more attention as a whole in the lower 
house, but it cannot explain variances between different parties. This could 
only be proven if it is established that certain parties and their members 
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consume different types of media. But even if this is the case, the decision 
to act on these news items is a decision made by MPs themselves. It then 
returns to the question of why this particular MP would raise a question in 
the first place. This thesis believes that focusing on a possible agenda-
setting effect does not contribute to the understanding of this case. 
In conclusion, there are multiple aspects that may influence a 
party’s behaviour regarding the amount and relative proportion of PQs 
which are related to human rights when engaging in China-related issues. 
First, the electoral tool theory argues that increases in electoral similarity 
imply that parties ask PQs to the government in order to discourage 
potential voters from voting for the relevant government parties, however, 
human rights are typically not a highly divisive topic during elections. It is 
expected that the electoral tool theory does not apply well with human 
rights PQs. So, I expect to see a significantly lower mean for electoral 
overlap for human rights PQs compared to non-human rights PQs. Second, 
the control tool theory argues that the more ideological distant a party, the 
more likely that party is to ask PQs. Since human rights are by its nature an 
idealistic topic, it is expected that overall ideological distance may explain 
some of the variations in the likelihood of asking human rights PQs. Finally, 
constituency oriented behaviour theory argues that PQs may be asked in 
order to satisfy the party’s constituents. The preliminary findings show that 
highly religious parties 47  often quote a protestant newspaper titled 
“Reformatorisch Dagblad” (literally: “Reformatory Daily”). Thus, I expect 
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that PQs belonging to parties adhering to confessionalism cannot properly 
be explained through electoral tool theory or ideological distance theory. 
Qualitative analysis of these references may show that these parties focus 





Chapter 3. Policy periods in Dutch-China relations 
This chapter provides an overview of China-policies pursued by the Dutch 
government in regards to China. It gives particular attention to the 
importance given to human rights within these bilateral engagements. The 
combination of chapter 2’s party characteristics and this chapter’s analysis 
of government policies makes it possible analyse party behaviour through a 
multi-faceted approach. 
 First this chapter discusses general human rights policy letters, 
starting with the first policy letter of 1979. Second, an overview of effective 
policy upheld by the Dutch government is given. This allows us to review to 
which extent human rights in China-policy was determined by general 
approaches to human rights by the Dutch government or because of the 
particularities of the Dutch-China relations. 
3.1 Development and changes of human rights policies 
The exact moment from which the Netherlands ‘embraced’ human 
rights policy remains a topic of debate. The debate is in agreement, 
however, that the minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1971, Joseph 
Luns, was hesitant to make human rights into foreign policy objectives. 
Only after domestic and international pressure did he condemn the Greek 
military junta of 1967-1974.48 The following cabinets that formed on the 6th 
of July 1972 and the 9th of august 1972 each only lasted a year. The short 
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timeframes in which the cabinets were formed and subsequently fell proved 
too narrow for any significant policies to take shape.49 
When the Den Uyl cabinet took office in 1973, it immediately 
expressed its ambition to make human rights a cornerstone of foreign 
policy. Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl stated on May 28 that year in the 
House of Representatives that "the close connection between peace, 
security, equitable distribution of wealth, world law and respect for 
fundamental human rights" would be a starting point for foreign policy. 
Malcontent, therefore, called the appointment of the Den Uyl cabinet the 
breakthrough for human rights as an integral part of foreign policy.50 In line 
with his ideas, he offered Van der Stoel and the Minister for Development 
Cooperation, Jan Pronk, space to make human rights part of their policy 
areas.51 
1) The human rights note of 1979 
Although human rights became embedded in foreign policy there 
were issues with its interpretations. This was due to the differing views of 
Pronk and Van der Stoel. 52  The House of Representatives needed a 
theoretical explanation of the place and instruments of human rights policy. 
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That statement came a cabinet period later in the form of the 1979 Human 
Rights Note.53 
In the note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained as fully as 
possible what human rights are, what their place in international relations, 
and what Dutch human rights policy entailed. The note turned out to be 
long-lived; in 2001 the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozias van Aartsen, 
still broadly referred to the memorandum as the basis for human rights 
policy. In the most recent policy letter on human rights, Minister 
Timmermans wrote somewhat more cautiously that Dutch values had not 
changed in 2013. He did not mention the policy outlined in 1979. 54 
The human rights policy letter of 1987 had several core aspects. 
First, human rights were equal to other policy objectives, but could not 
always take precedence. Other objectives such as maintaining good 
relations, security policy, arms exports, and trade facilitation should not 
suffer unacceptable damage from human rights policy. Second, human 
rights policy was considered most effective through a multilateral approach. 
Standards could be set by international institutions and subsequently 
enforced on its member states in return for politico-economic benefits.55 
Third, the Netherlands would address persistent human rights violations 
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bilaterally in case the multilateral approach failed.56 However, even in this 
case the Netherlands would aim to seek like-minded countries to form a 
coordinated political response such as aid to victims, confidential 
conversations (silent diplomacy), formal complaints to international 
organizations and public statements (naming & shaming), and in the most 
extreme cases sanctions.57 Finally, political rights should take precedence 
over social rights as political rights were considered a necessary condition 
for the improvement of social rights.58 
2) Notes and policy letters since 1979 
The 174 page Human Rights memorandum from 1979 was followed 
by a series of progress notes and policy letters in 1987, 1991, 1997, 2001, 
2007, 2011, and 2013. Like the 1979 Human Rights Memorandum, these 
documents set out the human rights policy of the incumbent government. 
The extent to which the 1979 policy principles were confirmed indicates the 
extent to which Dutch human rights policy had continuity. Before the notes 
are discussed, it is important to mention that several Ministers have 
therefore not published a human rights note. With one exception, this can 
be explained by premature cabinet changes that prevented the creation of 
such notes. However, the responsible ministers all took the 1979 note as a 
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starting point.59 Only Ben Bot spent four years as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
without issuing a human rights note. 
Hans van den Broek was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1987 
to issue a progress memorandum in addition to the 1979 Human Rights 
Memorandum. The progress memorandum was entirely in line with the 
memorandum and praised the effect it had. Human rights were 
"established", according to Van den Broek.60 
The subsequent progress note of 1991 contained similar texts with 
even more optimism due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
ideological struggle between East and West with additional security 
dilemmas had disappeared. Looking back, the tone of the note reveals the 
same euphoria that prompted Fukuyama to predict the end of history. The 
democratic constitutional state was the prospect of the entire world.  
In the third progress note of 1997 by Hans van Mierlo, however, this 
mood had to make way for reflection on new problems. Failing states like 
Yugoslavia proved to be real threats to human rights and the rise of Asian 
Values in some Asian countries put pressure on the principle of universality. 
Van Mierlo, therefore, changed the Dutch deployment somewhat. To 
counter the danger of failing states, he committed to conflict prevention, 
and he advocated the consolidation of existing human rights treaties.61 
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The last human rights memorandum explicitly building on the 1979 
Human Rights Memorandum came from Jozias van Aartsen in 2001. The 
memorandum found that the world had not fundamentally changed since 
the 1997 progress memorandum. A few months later, however, the focus of 
the international community would change drastically as a result of 9/11. 
The note was therefore actually published too early; Dutch policy in 
subsequent years was shaped to a greater extent by the ensuing fight 
against terrorism than by the policy intentions in the memorandum.62 
Maxime Verhagen presented a completely new human rights 
strategy in 2007, but was ultimately shown to not diverge much from 
policies as outlined in the 1979 note. Under his predecessor (Ben Bot), 
Dutch human rights policy had lost prestige and human rights had come 
under international pressure due to the war against terrorism. Above all, 
therefore, Verhagen wanted to consolidate what had been agreed 
internationally in treaties and declarations. There was no change with past 
policies. He simply gave human rights policy a more prominent point on the 
agenda again.63 
This changed in 2010 when VVD’s Uri Rosenthal was appointed as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the 5th of April, 2011 Rosenthal published a 
human rights policy letter called “Responsible for Liberty” which indicated 
that human rights policy would henceforth be subordinate to economic 
diplomacy and security policy. Rosenthal wanted to break from traditional 
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human rights policy in this respect: human rights were no longer considered 
on equal footing with other policy objectives. The new human rights policy 
had to be determined by selectivity and effectiveness criteria. This meant 
that the Netherlands would no longer approach human rights policy through 
the traditional, non-selective manner, but would only engage in a way that 
the government believed the Netherlands would have added value.64 A 
further explanation of what this would entail in policy came in the form of 
the AIV’s advisory letter titled “the receptor approach: a question of weight 
and measure”. The receptor approach was meant to be an approach which 
did would respect other cultures rather than trying to implement the 
Western style of law-based human rights, non-jurisdictional institutions 
already core to other cultures could serve the same function. Core to the 
receptor approach then was to identify those institutions and find ways to 
strengthen or reform them. This would, in theory, circumvent the cultural 
contrasts. Dialogue would still be a focus for the promotion of human rights 
worldwide, but the effectiveness of these efforts would have to be properly 
valued. In essence, rather than bilateral efforts, the government policy 
focused more on the combined strength of countries through multilateral 
institutions.65 
Rosenthal did not have long to implement his policy outlines. The 
cabinet fell apart after a mere year and a half. The new Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Frans Timmermans, delivered his new human rights foreign policy 
                                                          
64
 Parliamentary piece (HTK) 2010-2011, app. 32735, nr. 1. 
65
 AIV. “The Receptor Approach: A Question of Weight and Measure.” Advisory Letter, 
2012, No. 21: 1-15. 
34 
 
letter to parliament on the 14th of June 2013 titled “Respect and rights for 
every human”. The letter was meant as a reaffirmation of policy that had 
existed before Rosenthal. The letter stated that the Netherlands was a 
human rights advocate and would remain to be so. Rosenthal’s receptor 
approach and the selectivity and effectivity criteria were not even 
mentioned. 66  When a parliamentary question was subsequently asked 
about the similarities between the receptor approach and parts of the policy 
letter, Timmermans made it clear once again that his policy should not be 
associated with the receptor approach.67 
Timmermans’ belief in multilateral solutions for human rights policies 
showed through in the policy letter. The Netherlands would engage in 
trilateral approaches including both western partners and new partners. It 
would focus not only on state-level cooperation but also societal level and 
aim at the engagement of local populations through the internet. Another 
new idea was the improvement of human rights issues within the 
Netherlands and being open to criticism from the other countries as to not 
appear to be ‘above’ criticism.68  
No formal policy letter on international human rights has been 
publicised since. Instead, human rights policy has been integrated directly 
in the policy letters regarding NL-China relations. The first of these was 
developed in November 2013 with the title “The China-policy of the 
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Netherlands: Investing in Values and Commerce”, but as this was shortly 
after Timmermans’ revealed his human rights policy letter, it only referred 
back to that letter regarding Chinese human rights.69 An updated version 
came in March 2019 when Minister of Foreign Affairs Stef Blok delivered 
his policy letter titled “Netherlands-China: A New Balance”.70 In this policy 
letter, differences between Chinese and Dutch values were emphasized 
and states that China’s vision of human rights could have consequences for 
the Netherlands. This resulted, for the first time, a portion of the debate 
being surrounded by the protection of human rights in the Netherlands and 
Europe in opposition to Chinese influence.71 
In short, human rights notes and policy formulations show variations 
in perceptions towards China. Until 1989 human rights abuses in China 
were not well known or an issue in Dutch parliament and policy formulation, 
but this changed after the Tiananmen Square incident. Until 1997 the 
Netherlands would seek to actively condemn these issues through 
multilateral settings but stopped after it could not find the international 
backing it longed for. From then on until 2010 the Netherlands sought to 
approach the Chinese state to change the CCP’s systems of law and 
protection of human rights. This was interrupted in 2010 by Uri Rosenthal’s 
‘realist’ approach but was picked up again from 2012 until 2019 when Stef 
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Blok’s policy letter emphasized the protection of domestic human rights 
alongside the promotion of human rights in China. 
3.2 From paper to practice: Dutch China-policies over time 
To determine what makes policies distinct from one another there is 
a need to categorize possible approaches. Interpretations of China’s future 
role in international politics have divergent assumptions and conclusions. It 
is these assumptions from which, ultimately, policy regarding China is 
made. The existing theories regarding China’s rise have been categorized 
in table 3 in the appendix. These theories are drawn upon in determining 
when a certain policy period starts and ends. This is because human rights 
engagements with China may be influenced more so by the interpretation 
of whether or not it is effective when interacting with China. Therefore the 
choices made can give a completely different picture of human rights policy 
than the policy letters suggest. In other words, the difference between 
policy formulation and effective policy is sometimes enormous. In this way, 
the Ministry seems to balance between domestic opinion formation and 
foreign sensitivities. On the one hand, policy letters at home create the 
image of a powerful Netherlands that can be heard internationally, and on 
the other hand, in practice, the Netherlands proves to other countries that it 
wants to deal with its views.72 
1973 –1997: China Crisis theory 
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It is striking that where the Dutch human rights policy took shape in 
1973, a specific policy concerning China was only implemented in 1989. In 
the period 1973-1989, the Dutch China-policy was marked by its absence.73 
This was changed by the bloody crackdown on Tiananmen Square protests 
on June 4, 1989. In a PR fiasco for the Chinese state, a series of violations 
of the most basic human rights occurred in front of the global press. From 
one day to the next, China unwillingly placed itself at the centre of the 
international human rights lobby.74 
In the days after the Tiananmen protests in 1989, the idea prevailed 
in the Netherlands that China, following the Soviet Union, was on the verge 
of collapse. Relus ter Beek, Member of Parliament on behalf of the PvdA, 
put it as follows: 
“Today's youth in China have proven to their elderly leadership that 
their ideology and system are also outdated. China is waiting for a new 
generation of leaders who can and want to implement not only economic 
but also political reforms. These days it will be decided how long that 
waiting will take. " - Relus ter Beek.75 
                                                          
73
 Ibid.: 149. 
74
 Baker (2002): 55. 
75
 Parliamentary piece (HTK), 1988-1989, “explanation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
regarding the recent incidents in China”, nr. 83. Literal quote: “De jongeren in het China 
van nu hebben de oude leiders bewezen dat ook hun ideologie en hun systeem verouderd 
zijn. China wacht op een nieuwe generatie leiders die niet alleen economische, maar ook 
politieke hervormingen kunnen en willen doorvoeren. Dezer dagen zal worden beslist hoe 
lang dat wachten zal duren.” 
38 
 
Ter Beek saw the events in Tiananmen Square heralding an 
existential crisis for the regime. The entire House of Representatives 
shared his analysis. Minister Van den Broek also took this scenario into 
account, but as a statesman, he did not want to be too far ahead: the 
measures to be taken should not make future cooperation with China 
impossible in advance. However, the vision of the House of 
Representatives in June 1989 was fully in line with the China Crisis theory. 
The regime could fall over every day.76 
Believing that the government in China itself would not last, the 
Netherlands rather focused on raising the Chinese human rights situation 
with like-minded countries in a UN context than deal with the CCP directly. 
Initially, the Netherlands submitted a draft text for a thematic resolution to 
the General Assembly, but an active Chinese lobby resulted in 
amendments that nullified the resolution. Minister Van den Broek 
expressed frustration with the UN Human Rights Commission about the 
state of affairs, after which Australia took the lead and submitted a motion 
for a resolution condemning China. China again managed to prevent the 
resolution from coming about, this time thanks to a so-called no-action 
motion: the country managed to mobilize a majority in the Human Rights 
Commission to stop a substantive vote on the resolution.77 
In the following years, this scene repeated itself in the Human 
Rights Commission: a Western state submitted a motion for a resolution, 
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after which China dismissed it through a no-action motion. This cycle 
continued until 1997. 
In the run-up to the session of the Human Rights Commission in 
1997, the Netherlands chaired the EC who wished to field another 
resolution. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was convinced that the absence 
of such a resolution would be a victory for China. However, not everyone 
within the EC held this view. Ultimately, resistance to a resolution was too 
strong and as a result, in 1997, for the first time since the establishment of 
European cooperation in this field, no China resolution was tabled. Instead, 
Denmark submitted a resolution co-sponsored by the Netherlands. China 
again blocked the resolution through a no-action motion. The Netherlands 
and Denmark were also punished by China for their proactive stance by 
freezing bilateral ties for a year.78 
In 1997, therefore, the second major shift in Dutch human rights 
policy towards China took place. Public condemnation of abuses in China 
became the focus of human rights policy in 1989. Eight years later, this 
judgmental element of the policy disappeared through the side door, 
despite Dutch resistance. After all, resolutions in the Human Rights 
Commission were the condemnation par excellence: this is evident from the 
importance that the Netherlands attached to efforts to submit the 
resolutions year after year, and the importance that China attached to 
putting an end to the resolutions. Due to the continuous failure of these 
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resolutions, however, the Netherlands decided not to table any China-
related human rights resolutions anymore after 1997. 
1998 – 2010: Economic wow-factor 
From 1997 Dutch efforts were largely focused on cooperation with 
the government, with the most important instruments being the European-
Chinese human rights dialogue, attention to human rights during state visits, 
and the embassy's rule of law project. Such attention to influencing the 
government and government officials is not consistent with the belief that 
communist China would fall. The crisis theory, which initially formed the 
basis of the Dutch China policy, had reluctantly made way for a new vision 
of the future in 1997 and under European pressure. By stimulating 
economic interaction and ideological exchange, the new policy found itself 
in the camp of the Economic Wow Factor approach. Extensive interaction 
between China and the West was to have a socializing effect on China's 
human rights policy.79 
This does not mean that the Dutch policy towards Chinese human 
rights abuses changed completely from a stance of critique towards 
cooperation. For example, former Prime Minister Wim Kok received the 
Dalai Lama in 1999, even though it would make a confrontation with China 
inevitable. 80  Moreover, parliament has always expressed itself more 
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critically than the government itself. An example of this is the recurring 
appeal by the House of Representatives to China to end the occupation of 
Tibet.81 
Another period of particular interest in this era was the 2008 
Summer Olympics in Beijing. Opposition parties asked multiple PQs 
regarding the possibly forced evacuation of thousands of people from 
poorer districts in Beijing as these older buildings were subsequently 
bulldozed to clean up the city’s image.82 Other PQs called for the Prime 
Minister, queen, and Minister of Foreign Affairs not to partake in the 
opening ceremony as a moral statement against China’s human rights 
situation.83 The answer was, however, that such an action would not be 
beneficial if not in unison with other like-minded countries. No action was 
undertaken and the Dutch delegation attended the opening ceremony. 
2010 – 2012: Break from tradition 
 The receptor approach developed under Rosenthal did change 
Dutch policy. Anecdotally it was well-received by China. After all, the 
receptor approach acknowledged that there were cultural differences 
between the West and China, whose prior absence was the main point of 
critique from China itself. An example of this is that one of the think tanks 
behind the formulation of the receptor approach, Tom Zwart, was allowed 
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on Chinese state television to talk about his ideas.84 Not everyone, however, 
was enthusiastic about the approach. Academics and opposition parties 
critiqued the approach, stating that, despite the rhetoric, nothing quite new 
could be appointed in terms of policy lines. Furthermore, the approach 
seemed to give China a means to justify poor human rights practice: it 
could use culture as an apology for the existing policy.85 
 Economic policy was to become the core of NL-China relations. In 
both his human rights and economic policy letters he emphasized ‘the 
Dutch interest’ in foreign policy and vouched for more cooperation with 
businesses in these endeavours.86 However, there are not many practical 
examples of these policy implications, because the cabinet fell within two 
years of forming a coalition. There is only one economic activity through 
which an effective policy can be evaluated. The economic consideration 
was that of a single extensive trade mission. Verhagen, then minister of 
Economic Affairs, travelled to China in May 2011 with forty-five Dutch 
companies in his wake. During the mission, contracts with a combined 
value of more than one hundred million euros were concluded and a 
promise of commitment to building an economic consulate in Western 
China was made.87 Building on this success, the cabinet tried to set up 
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another trade mission in 2012, but this was eventually scaled down to one 
without ministerial representation. 
 In terms of human rights policy, the government was not able to 
give a clear answer to what the receptor approach would mean in terms of 
effective policy. In the human rights year report of 2011, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs stated that “human rights are universal, but its 
implementation is a domestic affair.” 88  This would imply that the 
Netherlands should not bother with China’s adherence to human rights at 
all since it was domestically completely up to China. Yet a slightly altered 
version arrived some months later as an answer to a PQ regarding the 
receptor approach stating that “in the receptor approach, countries are 
called to account for obligations arising from treaties to which they have 
voluntarily committed themselves”. 89  According to this statement, only 
treaties ratified by the countries themselves should be addressed, anything 
beyond the scope of those treaties would be up to the country themselves. 
This resulted in a PQ warning the Ministry of its consequences as China 
had not ratified the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and such statements ‘de-universalising’ human rights would give 
countries such as China the excuse of never having to ratify it at all.90 
 A second issue from which policy can be evaluated is the annual 
prize awarded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the Human 
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Rights Tulip. An independent jury had determined to give the prize to the 
Chinese human rights lawyer Ni Yulan. She had fought against the 
bulldozing of houses in Beijing prior to the 2008 Summer Olympics. She 
had consequently been imprisoned, tortured by police in 2008 which put 
her in a wheelchair, and lost her license as a lawyer.91 The ceremony 
should originally have taken place on December 9, 2011, but was 
postponed to early 2012. Rosenthal opposed the award but, unable to 
prevent it, distanced himself from the Ministry’s own human rights prize.92 
Likely this was an effort to not invoke Chinese retaliation. A year prior the 
Nobel committee had given the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, which 
Norway had to pay for with Chinese economic sanctions. 
In prior policy, human rights had received a position equal to those 
of other considerations. However, Rosenthal’s actions suggest that for him, 
human rights problems were in the way of his desire to strengthen 
economic ties with China. His effective policy, in combination with the 
statements regarding the receptor approach, can be classified under 
‘moderated futurism’. After all, moderate futurism dictates that human rights 
diplomacy must be based on sovereignty. Priority is therefore given to 
harder policy areas such as increasing prosperity and security policy. 
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2013 – 2018: return to normalcy 
In the November 2013 policy document, Timmermans explained 
that the importance of government contact was invaluable in the 
relationship with China. After all, the Chinese government was strongly 
intertwined with business. Excellent governmental contacts, therefore, 
formed the basis of a successful China policy. In other words, cooperation 
was imperative; confrontation with consequently closed doors should be 
avoided.93 At the same time, Timmermans did not want to subordinate 
values to economics. The innovative approach announced by the minister 
in his human rights letter provided the means to this end. First of all, the 
human rights dialogue had to be conducted as broadly as possible: all 
ministers would touch upon the subject within their respective domains and 
the Netherlands would also actively seek out contacts outside the 
government, for example through the human rights ambassador. Second, 
the Netherlands and the E.U. would need to show more appreciation for 
China's progress in economic and social rights, and the Netherlands itself 
would be more open to Chinese criticism of Dutch human rights policy. This 
would create an equal and more constructive dialogue on human rights 
policy. In this way, a confrontation behind closed doors would be avoided 
as a result, while a substantive discussion could be conducted.94 
 Human rights was therefore no longer a theme on its own but 
rather were to be implemented in all facets of interaction with China, 
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regardless of topic. The issues were then also to be raised in a constructive 
manner in the hope of improving human rights without angering China. In 
lieu of this policy outline, the interaction did seem to increase. In 2013 
Timmermans and Prime-Minister Rutte visited China for the Nuclear 
Security Summit and Rutte subsequently announced on the national news 
that the Netherlands had resumed human rights talks with China after 
which the human rights ambassador visited China as well.95 The following 
year Xi Jinping came for a state visit to the Netherlands himself during 
which human rights were discussed again within the context of bilateral 
international cooperation.96 In a subsequent royal state visit by the Dutch 
King Willem van Oranje-Nassau to China human rights mentioned as well, 
albeit extremely briefly.97 Yet Timmermans’ vision of a transparent human 
rights dialogue did not work at all times. Lists of expenditures regarding the 
government’s human rights fund do list efforts and expenditures in China, 
particularly Beijing, but the projects are often labelled as ‘confidential’, 
attesting that closed-door dialogue and activities are still the norms when 
dealing with Chinese human rights.98 
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 The Dutch approach to China’s human rights reverted back to its 
original proposition: improving human rights by engaging with China. This 
falls back into the Economic Wow Factor approach which was held until 
2010.99 Although the approach of implementing the debate within other 
spheres of interest is a new iteration, it remains the same at the core. 
Improving Chinese human rights is done through interactions and 
cooperation in the hope of changing the Chinese system.  
2019 and beyond: In search for a new strategy 
 The first indication that a new policy would be formulated came 
with the publication of the European Commission’s (EC) EU-wide policy 
letter “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook”. For the first time, the EC did not 
frame the relationship as largely full of opportunities but rather focused on 
negative aspects such as its grievances with Chinese protectionism, 
investments in European’s ‘critical infrastructures’, and general unwanted 
Chinese influence.100 PQs asking whether critical infrastructures were also 
the target in the Netherlands got a response that the government was 
already re-evaluating their relationship with China and a new policy letter 
would be delivered shortly.101 The subsequent policy letter by Stef Blok 
announced greater interest in the protection of Dutch critical infrastructures, 
increasing pressure on China to abolish unfair economic protectionism by 
adhering to WHO standards, increasing cybersecurity, publicly announcing 
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positions on Chinese human rights, increasing cooperation towards climate 
goals, working together with China in developmental projects in Africa and 
focusing on a unified-EU to monitor and possibly counter Chinese (political) 
pressure and/or influence.102 Dutch policy towards China had never been 
more multifaceted. 
 In an advisory piece requested by the cabinet from the AIV, a core 
aspect of the interpretation of China as a state comes forward. “Here 
appears a fundamentally different civilization, a different power. We meet 
this country on all international stages and even at home, sometimes as 
rivals or competitors, sometimes as unmissable partners… Where 
convergence is impossible and confrontation undesirable, the relationship 
takes shape as a meeting of two systems, civilizations, players”. The AIV 
further advised not to take a frontrunner position in emphasizing human 
rights in multilateral settings when a majority was uncertain, as the political-
economical costs could be high. The response by the cabinet was that, 
although it did agree that achieving a majority before any voting regarding 
human rights statements were important, it dismissed the AIV’s advice that 
the Netherlands should not be a leading country on the issue.103 It did, 
however, agree that it had started to influence foreign states on more than 
just the economic level. The perceived dangers of Chinese influence 
abroad, particularly within the EU would lead to the belief that the policy 
adheres to the ‘China Threat’ theory, in which China is considered as a 
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power fundamentally endangering current world order. Here, trying to 
change its domestic human rights situation would be difficult as human 
rights would be considered a bargaining chip in power politics. In this 
situation rather than cooperating with China on improving Chinese human 
rights, there would be a return to publicly criticizing the Chinese 
government. There is reason to believe that this may be happening. The 
Dutch embassy in Beijing posted a message on its official Weibo account 
stating “One of the wishes for 2020 that the Netherlands has is for all 
countries globally to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
unconditionally” along with a screenshot of a Chinese court document that 
sentenced a Chinese Christian pastor to 9 years in jail.104 The Netherlands 
also co-signed a statement regarding the detention of Uyghur minorities, 
issued to the UN human rights commission on October 29, 2019.105 
 The formulation of an approach to China and its effective human 
rights policy do not seem to be completely aligned. Although the cabinet 
acknowledges the increasing political Chinese influence and does perceive 
it as a threat, human rights engagements with China are not completely 
aligned with the common human rights approach associated with countries 
adhering to the China Threat theory. The human rights dialogue is more 
public and because of it, more confrontational. However, most of the 
human rights debates still take place behind closed doors and the 
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Netherlands continues its policy of improving human rights situations 
through development cooperation in China. Placing the approach into a 
category has difficulties because its implementation is less than a year ago, 
but there seems to be a mix of two approaches. The first approach is the 
traditional ‘economic wow factor’ approach in which the economic benefits 
of having good relationships with China are wanted, although the approach 
is more sceptical than before. This is also shown by the adherence of trying 
to get China to adhere to the Covenant of Human Rights which is 
implementing China into the international system of law. The second 
approach is that of the ‘China Threat Theory’. Here, the possibility of China 
influencing human rights elsewhere is acknowledged and these Chinese 
influences abroad, both within the EU and elsewhere are seen as possible 
threats, including to human rights. The current cabinet seems in the 
crossroads between these two strategies: Economic Wow Factor and 
China Threat theory.106 
3.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter discussed the Dutch policies of human rights and 
those in regards to China. Table 3.1 shows the time periods for each policy, 
the applicable theory to their approach, and the adhered to China-specific 
human rights policy. 
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Table 3.1 Approaches to China and human rights policy per time period 
Time period Approach to China China-human rights policy 
1973 – 1989 China Crisis Theory I Non-existent 
1989 – 1997 China Crisis Theory II Critique in multilateral setting 
1997 - 2010 Economic Wow Factor I  Improvement through 
cooperation 
2010 – 2012 Moderated Futurism Selectivity in discussing human 
rights topics: receptor approach 
2012 – 2019 Economic Wow Factor II Implementation of dialogue in 
other fields of interaction 
2019 – current Economic Wow 
Factor/China threat theory 
Improvement through dialogue 
and domestic protection 
Source: data collected by the author. 
   
The period of 1973 to 1997 was shown to be typified by the belief 
that the CCP would not be able to retain power in China. However, only 
after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident did human rights issues in China 
become prevalent in Dutch foreign policy. The usage of economic 
development as a tool in improving China’s human rights that started in 
1997 is still present today and was only briefly interrupted during the policy 
period of Uri Rosenthal from 2010 to 2012. Currently in 2019, this approach 
is starting to shift, but policy has not completely moved away from 
traditional policy. 
A period of interest not apparent in this table is the China Olympics 
in Beijing in 2008. During this period, China rose to salience and became a 
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heavily debated topic in Dutch parliament. This outlier should be noted 
when analysing the data as it is likely to have temporarily have affected 
party behaviour.  
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I will spell out how the pertinent data are collected, which 
variables are appropriate to capture the major constructs or concepts, and 
how I purport to substantiate the relationships among those variables. 
4.1. Data Collection 
764 parliamentary questions were collected from 1973 until 2019. The 
reason for the timespan is simply that the first China-related parliamentary 
question on record was raised on the 14th of August in 1973. Thus the data 
set includes all known China-related parliamentary questions until the 
moment of data collection. This is in accordance with King et al.’s (1994) 
position that it is best to collect data on as many of its observable 
implications as possible.107  The parliamentary questions were gathered 
through entering keywords in the search engine of the digital database of 
government documents from the Dutch government at 
“www.officielebekendmakingen.nl“.108 The most important criterion of the 
data was that the question had to be directly related to China as the sole 
topic of interest. For instance, during the nuclear disarmament movements 
in the 1980s, multiple questions regarding the nuclear disarmament of all 
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nuclear powers were asked, including China. However, these questions 
related to a list of countries that all had nuclear capabilities in common, not 
to China specifically. Such questions that merely mention China in a list of 
multiple countries without addressing a question specifically towards China 
were excluded from the list. The resulting collected data was made into a 
single data set file to be analysed with the software package “SPSS 
Statistics”. 
Table 4.1. Keywords used during data collection 
Classification Keywords used (Dutch) 
Noun and adjectives China, Chinees, Chineze(n) 
Chinese Cities Shanghai/Sjanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, 
Tianjin, Chongqing, Hangzhou, 
Chengdu, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, 
Nanjing 
Presidents Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Dong Biwu, 
Song Qingling, Li Xiannian, Yang 
Shangkun, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi 
Jinping 
Issues of international attention Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, Olympische 
Spelen, Tiananmen, Uyghur/Uighur, 
Tibet, Tibetaans(e) 
Source: list compiled by the author. 
 
 Not all observations collected during data-collection were used for 
analysis. This is because of the distorting effect of two specific parties: the 
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PvdD and DENK.109 The Partij van de Dieren (Animal Party, PvdD) is a 
single-issue party that focuses solely on animal-rights abuses in which the 
Netherlands is either directly or indirectly involved. For instance, out of the 
35 PQs asked by the PvdD 17 of them were in regard to the 2008 Summer 
Olympics in Beijing. Reports came in that street animals were being hunted 
down in order to clean up the city’s image prior to the Olympics. The PvdD 
fielded numerous questions asking the government to condemn these 
actions as one of the countries participating in the event. All other 18 
questions were about meat products of Chinese origin. The PvdD argued 
that the Netherlands should not import meat from countries that have no or 
limited legal protection of farm animals. The content of these PQs shows 
that the PvdD has no direct interest in China or a specific approach towards 
China itself. Their only concerns are animal rights and welfare. 
 The party DENK was founded in 2016 after two MPs of Turkish 
descent disagreed with a statement regarding immigration from their party 
at the time, the Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party, PvdA). DENK proclaims 
itself to be focused on immigration issues, but the party is completely 
represented by MPs of Turkish-Dutch origins. The word DENK is also 
chosen because of its Turkish meaning “equality”.  Since its formation, the 
party has raised 12 PQs involving China, all of them about the persecution 
of Muslim Uyghur minorities in western China. This should be viewed as 
purely constituency-oriented behavior. After all, the two MPs formerly active 
for the PvdA did not raise the Uyghur issue a single time prior to founding 
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DENK. Furthermore human rights PQs also often include the persecution of 
other religious minorities such as Christians or Tibetans, as well as 
government critics. Yet, none of these issues have been raised by DENK 
MPs. Both the PvdD and DENK distort the analysis of our case. It is clear 
that both raise questions because of their constituencies. Because these 
parties are not representative of party behavior in Dutch politics, nor are 
they part of a field of politics that spans multiple parties, the PQs raised by 
both the PvdD and DENK have been removed from the data set during 
analysis. 
4.2 Variables: selection and operationalization 
There are three types of variables that this research is concerned with: 
dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables. The 
dependent variable of this thesis is “China-related human rights 
parliamentary questions”. This is a binary variable of whether or not a 
China-related parliamentary question is human rights-related.  The 
independent variables have been identified in accordance with the theories 
discussed in Chapter 2. These are ideological distance, electoral overlap, 
coalition member, religious constituency. The control variables are 
independent variables that are not of substantive interest to the hypothesis 
under examination but may have a non-zero covariance with the variables 
being researched. Including these variables in a regression, it can improve 
the fit of the model, if excluded whilst having a non-zero covariance it may 
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bias the regression’s result. The control variables included in the data set 
are party size and opposition party status.  
1) Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable in the dataset is whether or not a 
question is human rights-related. It is therefore necessary to identify a 
framework for when parliamentary questions should be considered human 
rights-related or not. What consists of human rights is well documented in 
the Dutch case. The first chapter of the Dutch constitution codifies the 
rights of all Dutch inhabitants and the Netherlands is a signatory to virtually 
all relevant international human rights instruments.110 This thesis bases its 
identification criterion on human rights as laid out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. This declaration by the 
UN is universal, making its content applicable to any part of the world, 
unlike the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which confines 
itself to within European borders.111 The UDHR consists of a total of thirty 
articles. Articles 1 and 2 establish the basic concepts of dignity, liberty, and 
equality. Articles 3 to 5 establish basic individual rights such as the right to 
life and the prohibition of slavery and torture. Articles 6 to 11 discuss the 
rights of individuals’ defence and treatment in case of being accused of a 
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crime. Articles 12 to 17 discuss individual rights within communities. These 
include the right to privacy, freedom of movement, freedom to asylum, right 
of nationality, right to consent in marriage, and right to property. Articles 18 
to 21 focus on freedom of speech. These include freedom of opinion and 
expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. Articles 22 to 27 discuss individual economic, social, and 
cultural rights. These include healthcare, right to a standard of living112, 
care for the disabled, and care to those in motherhood or childhood. Finally, 
articles 28 to 30 establish that laws and duties can only inhibit personal 
freedoms for the sake of protecting the freedom of others.  Using these 
articles as a basis, all questions have been codified of being human rights-
related or not. 
During codification, several questions became issues regarding 
whether or not they should be considered a human rights-related question. 
For instance, questions regarding the adoption of children from China have 
been raised on multiple occasions over a wide variety of years, but not all 
questions have the same content. Most of these questions related to the 
‘one-child policy’ and that adopted children may have been forcibly 
removed from their parents.113 These have been codified as human rights 
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questions as they referred both to China and the human rights of the infants 
and their parents in China. Another question, however, asked the 
government if they were aware that PTSD had been found in multiple 
adoption children. The question was not directed to China itself to call for 
action but was focusing on the wellbeing of the children who were already 
in the Netherlands to see that they got proper mental health care.114 In this 
case, should the question be considered a China-related human rights 
question? This research decided to not codify it as a China-related human 
rights question. The reasoning is that the main concern of the question was 
the welfare of inhabitants of the Netherlands, not the question of human 
rights morality of adoptions from China. 
2) Independent Variables 
In order to draw correct inferences, we must be certain that our 
variables are measuring what we think they are measuring. This requires 
us to maximize the validity of our measurements by operationalizing the 
independent variables into proper measurements. 115  This poses the 
question of what types of measurements should be put in place for the 
independent variables ‘ideological distance’, ‘electoral overlap’, ‘coalition 
member’, and ‘religious constituency’. 
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 Ideological distance in essence refers to the distance that two 
parties’ policies have from one another.116 In order to operationalize this 
variable, literature developed a positioning framework called the GAL/TAN 
framework. 117  The acronym GAL/TAN stands for “Green, Alternative, 
Liberal / Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalism”. Parties adhering more to 
GAL ideology typically support more expansive personal freedoms such as 
greater civil liberties and a greater role for citizens in governing. Parties in 
the TAN end of the spectrum are more focused on law and order, tradition, 
and the idea that the government should be a strong, moral actor.118 This 
thesis makes use of the datasets on party ideologies and policies of the 
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES).119 The dataset consists of answers to 
questionnaires on four items: (1) general party positioning on the left-right 
dimension, (2) party positioning on economic left-right, (3) party positioning 
on the GAL-TAN dimension, and (4) general party positioning on European 
integration. 120  This dataset uses the data of party positioning on the 
GAL/TAN dimension as it is the closest measurement of ideological 
distance. In these datasets, experts from EU member states were asked to 
number each party on an 11-point scale (0-10) from “extremely GAL” (0) to 
“extremely TAN” (10) on a number of different policies. The average score 
of these responses was taken as the GAL/TAN score per party. Surveys 
have been conducted in 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2017. The 
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average GAL/TAN score of each party is between 1998 and 2017 was 
taken for the data between 1973 and 1998. However, no data is available 
of the parties PPR, DS’70, and PSP as they disbanded before the first 
survey of 1998. This resulted in missing data for this variable on 9 
occasions. The scores of each party are listed in table 3 in the appendix. 
 As the theoretical framework established that ideological distance 
and electoral overlap are not equivalent in the Netherlands, a separate 
measurement for electoral overlap must be established. Measuring 
electoral overlap has proven difficult in parliamentary settings due to the 
plurality of parties involved. Here, the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 
(DPES) offers reliable statistics.121  In this survey, scores are available 
regarding the question “probability of a future vote” (PFV). Respondents 
were asked how likely they were to vote for every party in the future on an 
11-point scale from ‘certainly never’ to ‘sometime certainly’. On a scale of 
0-10, this thesis caught the share of voters who said they gave a voting 
probability of a minimum of 7 for both parties. For instance, during the 1998 
election, 2185 voters gave the PvdA or Groenlinks a PFV score of 6 or 
higher whereas 562 of them gave both parties a 7 or higher. This translates 
into a 562/2185=25.7% overlap, within the same year. If a minister is asked 
a question by an MP from within his or her own party, then the variable for 
electoral overlap is noted as zero (0,00) since electoral overlap on a party 
level is not present within the same party. This way of measuring electoral 
overlap was first used by Otjes and Louwerse (2018) and has since also 
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been applied by Höhmann and Sieberer (2020). It must be said that this 
cannot be considered a perfect estimate of electoral overlap. However, the 
measurement is likely to be highly correlated as it measures the proportion 
of voters that have amicable perceptions of both parties. Voters with a 
strong inclination to a single party would be unlikely to give a high score to 
the statement “likelihood of a future vote” towards parties that they would 
not consider voting for in favour of their personal party identity. As the 
method of measuring between each party is the same for all parties, it is 
internally valid. Therefore, I argue that significant differences between party 
types and the likelihood of raising human-rights PQs can still be correctly 
analysed, but the exact measures’ limitations to external validity must be 
acknowledged. 
The third independent variable ‘coalition member’ is the easiest of 
these four variables to determine. It is a simple binary, categorical variable 
of whether or not the MP asking a PQ is from a party that is a coalition 
member of the current government to whom the MP asks the PQ. A 
positive relation might imply that PQs are being used in this case as a 
control tool for coalition governments. 
 The variable of ‘religious constituency’ refers to whether or not a 
party’s identity is heavily reliant on religion. This is called ‘confessionalism’ 
and parties that adhere to this must mention in their manifesto that they 
base their political standings on testimonial grounds. The four parties with 
religious affiliation in the Netherlands are (or were) the CDA, CU, SGP, 
63 
 
GPV, and RPF. The GPV and RPF merged into the CU in 2000. The CU, 
SGP, GPV, and RPF all refer to the bible, Christian values, and the 
importance of Dutch, religious heritage. The CDA does refer to itself as 
being Christian-democrats, yet they do not refer to a religious aspect when 
discussing cultural beliefs and values. The CDA rather phrases these as 
‘our’ values, evading a stance of being strictly religious. The argument that 
the CDA differs from testimonial parties is strengthened by their supportive 
stances on issues such as abortion and euthanasia. These topics are 
predominantly agreed upon by secular Dutch parties but are opposed by 
the traditional, religious parties. Because of these differences, this thesis 
classifies the CDA as a non-testimonial party, whereas the CU, SGP, GPV, 
and RPF are classified as testimonial parties.  
3) Control variables 
The control variables of party size and opposition party status have 
been included in the data set because of their potential correlation with how 
many parliamentary questions each party asks. Party size is important 
simply because larger parties have more MPs at their disposal. The amount 
of time of an individual MP is finite. A party with more seats in the lower 
house is therefore expected to have more MPs in charge of specific topics 
and policies. The value of party size is the direct numerical value of the 
number of seats a party possesses in the lower house out of a total of 150. 
Opposition party status is a yes or no categorical value that identifies if a 
question is asked by an MP from a party that is in opposition to the coalition 
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government at the time. This is because opposition parties are expected to 
ask more questions of coalition governments than the coalition partners 
due to both ideological differences and political willingness to scrutinize 
coalition parties. This variable controls for that correlation. 
4.3 Missing variables 
The implementation of independent variables in our data resulted in a 
couple of missing variables. This is because some PQs were fielded by 
MPs of multiple parties. These multi-party initiatives have some 
consequences for determining our independent variables. The electoral 
overlap is difficult to determine with multi-party PQs because electoral 
overlap would also be a factor between the parties asking the PQ, thus in 
these cases, the electoral overlap is considered a missing variable. 
Ideological distance in this case is not considered a missing variable as 
larger ideological distance are hypothesized to lead to more PQs. Thus, the 
average ideological distance of the parties asking the PQ should still be a 
valid measurement. Finally, some multi-party PQs may consist of parties 
from both within the coalition and from the opposition. In this case, the 




Chapter 5. Party characteristics and party 
behaviour 
This chapter discusses the findings from the gathered data. Chapter 2 
discussed reasons for party behaviour and how they might be different 
between opposition and coalition parties. However, the preliminary data 
analysis showed that amongst the opposition members, confessional 
parties might act distinctly different in regards to Chinese human rights. 
Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to data analysis, with particular 
attention being paid to which extent confessional parties differ from the 
other groups. 
5.1 Observations of PQ data 
Table 5.1. Frequency statistics 
Variable Category  f Rel f 
PQ content Non human rights PQ 402 0,554 
 
Human rights PQ 324 0,446 
 Total 726 1,000 
Party status Opposition 426 0,587 
 
Coalition member 187 0,258 
 
Own party 93 0,128 
 
Multiparty 20 0,028 
 Total 726 1,000 
Religion status Non-testimonial party 638 0,879 
 
Testimonial party 80 0,110 
 
Total 718 0,989 
 Missing 8 0,011 




 Table 5.1 shows the frequencies of our main dependent variable 
‘human rights PQ’, and the explanatory variables ‘coalition member’ and 
‘confessionalism’. Out of the total of 726 China-related PQs collected, 324 
were observed to be related to human rights, corresponding to 44.6% 
whereas 402 PQs, or 55.4%, were not related to human rights. The data 
shows that PQs are a tool more used by opposition parties with 426, or 
58.7% of PQs fielded by opposition members, 187 or 25.8% by coalition 
members, 93 or 12.8% by an MP of the same party as the Minister, and 20 
or 2.8% asked through a multiparty effort. The confessionalism variable 
shows that testimonial parties asked about 80 or 11% of all PQs whereas 
non-testimonial parties asked 638, or 87.9%. The missing data here is due 
to multiparty PQs including both non-testimonial and testimonial parties. 
Testimonial parties ask relatively a lot of questions compared to their size 
as they typically only hold around 8 to 9 seats in parliament out of 150 
seats, which is somewhere around 5 – 6%. 
Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Electoral Overlap 598 0,014 0,259 0,12375 0,063337 
Ideological distance 593 0,011 7,793 2,43533 1,532133 
Ideological distance - 
GAL/TAN scale 593 -6,535 7,793 -0,12464 2,87631 
Party Size 698 1 54 21,63 13,441 




 Table 5.2 shows the descriptives of the two explanatory variables 
‘electoral overlap’, and ‘ideological distance’. The electoral overlap variable 
shows that on average the parties of the PQ asker and PQ receiver overlap 
about 12.375% with a minimum of 1.4% and a maximum of 2.59%. 
Ideological distance is measured in two ways. The first variable ‘ideological 
distance’ is the absolute difference between two parties’ GAL/TAN scores, 
resulting in scores of higher than 0 only. The lowest measured ideological 
distance is 0.011 whereas the highest distance is 7.793 and the average 
ideological distance is 2.43533. The second variable ‘ideological distance – 
GAL/TAN scale’ takes the GAL/TAN scale into account. Thus when the 
minister asked the PQ has a higher score than the PQ asker the higher 
score deducted from the lower score gives possible values below 0. Thus 
the lowest measured score is -6.535 whereas the highest was the same as 
the ‘ideological distance’ measurement with 7.793. The mean here of -
0,12464 shows that there might be a slight inclination of PQs being more 
often asked by parties further towards the GAL side compared to the 
ministers’ parties. Finally, the party size is a control variable which shows 
parties that asked PQs had a minimum of 1 seat and a maximum of 54 
seats, with an average between 21 and 22 seats. 
 To answer the research question - Can human rights be 
considered any different from other topics on international relations with 
China? – this analysis includes two tests. First, performing a t-test in SPSS 
allows us to determine whether or not the means of the independent 
variables deviate between human rights PQs and non-human rights PQs. 
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This is relevant because it indicates to what extent human rights 
differentiates itself as a topic in Dutch politics. Second, an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression analysis is performed. This multiple linear 
regression tests whether the dependent variable can be predicted by the 
independent variables. 
Table 5.3. Independent samples test measuring differences in means between 
human rights PQs and non-human rights PQs. 
 t-test for Equality of means 




95% conf. int. 
Lower Upper 
Party Size Eq. var. -5,139 696 .000 -5.190 1.010 -7.173 -3.207 
No eq var -5.132 638.75 .000 -5.190 1.011 -7.176 -3.204 
Electoral 
Overlap 
Eq. var. -4.088 596 .000 -0.021 0.005 -0.031 -0.011 




Eq. var. -0.322 591 .747 -0.041 0.126 -0.289 0.207 





Eq. var. 1.947 591 .052 0.460 0.236 -0.004 0.924 
No eq var 1.948 580.18 .052 0.460 0.236 -0.004 0.924 
Confessio
nalism 
Eq. var. 7.245 716 .000 0.165 0.023 0.121 0.210 
No eq var 6.761 432.93 .000 0.165 0.024 0.117 0.214 
Coalition 
member 
Eq. var. -4.587 704 .000 -0.246 0.054 -0.351 -0.141 
No eq var -4.687 696.47 .000 -0.246 0.053 -0.349 -0.143 




 Table 5.3 shows whether or not the means of our variables are 
significantly different for human rights PQs as compared to non-human 
rights PQs. The results show several significant results. First, the average 
party size of parties asking human rights PQs is significantly smaller than 
those asking non-human rights PQs. This is in line with expectations as the 
confessional parties addressing a considerable amount of human rights 
PQs have a considerably smaller amount of seats than the mean of 
21,63.122 Second, electoral overlap seems to have a negative correlation 
with the likelihood of human rights PQs being asked. The expectation that 
human rights play no significant role in elections seems to be supported by 
this data. Third, although absolute ideological distance shows no significant 
difference, ideological distance along the GAL/TAN scale shows that there 
is a significant correlation between human rights PQs and parties adhering 
more to the TAN side of politics.123 The explanation is possibly due to the 
effect of confessional parties, these parties score high on the GAL/TAN 
scale due to their overall highly conservative stances. 124  Fourth, as 
expected, confessionalism correlates highly with human rights PQs. Finally, 
being a coalition member correlates negatively with the likelihood of asking 
human rights-related PQs. The theoretical framework of chapter 2 
discussed this possibility as an expected higher average ideological 
distance could cause opposition parties to focus more on topics embedded 
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in ideology such as human rights. This shows the necessity for the 
regression analysis to include models focused on either opposition or 
coalition politics. 
 
Table 5.4. Linear Regression model explaining the likelihood of a 
party fielding human rights PQs over non-human rights PQs. 









































R² 0.092 0.095 0.149 
Adj. R² 0.085 0.084 0.124 
N 589 411 176 
Source: Results from data set collected by author. 
Note: Regression coefficients with responding standard error in brackets 




 The multiple regression analysis was carried out to assess 
whether party size, electoral overlap, ideological distance, and 
confessionalism could predict the likelihood of a PQ being human rights-
related. It is important to note that high a R² number was not expected. This 
is because we are interested in the increased likelihood of raising human 
rights PQs over other topics to understand what party characteristics cause 
these differences rather than explaining what party characteristics cause 
human rights PQs to be fielded in absolute terms. 
  Model 1 of the regression analysis includes the multiple 
regression analysis of all our gathered PQs. Model 2 only measures PQs 
raised by opposition parties and model 3 only contains PQs fielded by 
coalition party members. Party size is shown to be significant in model 1, 
but not in models 2 or 3. Furthermore, although significant, its effect is 
extremely small. This confirms our suspicions from the t-test analysis: 
confessional parties have likely caused party size to significantly correlate 
with the likelihood of raising human rights PQs. Electoral overlap showed 
no significance in either model 1 or 2 but did in model 3. Furthermore, 
model 3 shows a negative causality. It was expected that electoral overlap 
would cause a decrease in the likelihood of asking human rights PQs 
because of human rights’ limitations as a topic of contention during 
elections. However, it is notable that this negative causality was expected 
in all models, not just model 3. The ideological distance was measured to 
be significant, but only in the case of models 1 and 2. Furthermore, 
ideological distance has a negative effect on human rights PQs. This 
72 
 
means that, although small, opposition parties are more likely to ask human 
rights related PQs when they are less ideologically distant. The ideological 
distance along the GAL/TAN scale shows the opposite results. No 
significance was found in models 1 and 2, but there was significance found 
in model 3. The causality shown in the regression shows that coalition 
parties are more likely to ask human rights related PQs when they are more 
ideologically oriented to the GAL side compared to the party of the Minister 
they ask their question to. Finally, as expected confessionalism shows 
strong significance with the likelihood of raising human rights-related PQs. 
The exception of this is for coalition parties, where no significance was 
established. It is possible that being in the coalition has an effect on the 
likelihood of a confessional party asking human rights related PQs, but the 
data is too preliminary for a definitive conclusion. The reason is that the 
only confessional party to have been part of a coalition government is the 
CU which is currently part of a four party coalition since 2017. During this 
time, however, they have only raised 4 China-related PQs, 2 of which are 
human rights related. This may appear to be a significantly lower focus on 
human rights related PQs, but the number of observations is too small to 
conclude causality. 
5.2. Results and theoretical implications 
 Chapter two discussed four theories that explained parliamentary 
behaviour regarding PQs: electoral tool theory, control tool theory, 
constituency oriented behaviour theory, and agenda-setting theory. Except 
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for agenda-setting theory, these were hypothesized to have possible 
influences on the likelihood of parties asking human rights related PQs over 
other topics. 
 The electoral tool theory proposed that parties would be more 
likely to field questions in the case of higher electoral overlap. However, 
this study does not look simply at the likelihood or frequency of PQs in itself, 
but asks why parties would choose to focus on human rights above other 
topics when engaging with China. Human rights policies are not expected 
to have a considerable impact on elections. This is because, in general, 
human rights issues are far removed from the general populace’s everyday 
lives and thus carry too little salience to make a considerable impact on 
election results. The analyses of this chapter support this hypothesis. The 
electoral overlap has a negative correlation with the likelihood of raising 
human rights PQs. This would imply that parties with a lower electoral 
overlap have fewer incentives to focus on topics that may impact elections. 
This means not that parties are more inclined to ask about human rights 
issues, but less inclined to ask about other, more election oriented topics. 
This causes these parties to naturally have a higher proportion of their PQs 
to be about human rights issues. 
 Through ideological distance theory, it was hypothesized that 
ideological distance would have a positive causal relationship with the 
likelihood of fielding human rights PQs. The outcomes, however, show 
mixed results. The absolute ideological distance variable showed no 
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significance in the t-test and only a weak effect in the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, counter to expectations this effect showed the opposite of the 
expected outcome. The GAL/TAN scale showed a weak significance in the 
t-test, but a sturdy significance in model 3 of the regression analysis. The 
regression analysis showed that parties that are more on the GAL side of 
politics compared to their coalition partners are more inclined to ask human 
rights related PQs, but this effect was also relatively weak. 
 Finally, confessionalism showed strong causality in all of our tests 
and all models except for model 3 which is likely caused by lack of 
sufficient observations. However, as neither ideological distance nor 
electoral overlap can explain the reason for confessional parties’ focus on 
human rights PQs it brings up the question of whether this behaviour is 
constituency oriented. The theory showed that it was difficult to statistically 
determine when a PQ should be considered as constituency oriented. 
Therefore, the following graph shows the content of all human rights-related 
PQs of each confessional party. The graph shows that the majority of 
human rights-related PQs are not simply about human rights, they are 
predominantly about Christian rights. Considering that confessional parties 
are highly religious and have similar religious constituencies, it would imply 
that these parties do not target human rights in China because they care a 
lot about human rights in general; they seem to do so because they care 





 Graph 4.2 confirms that confessional parties are likely engaging in 
constituency oriented behaviour. Out of the 68 human rights related PQs 
raise by confessional parties, 53 of the news articles referenced in these 
PQs are not main-stream news outlets. The Reformatorisch Dagblad 
(Reformed Daily) is a newspaper officially aligned with the SGP. It is a 
Christian daily newspaper whose website cites a different biblical psalm 
every day except for Sundays on which the website is inaccessible.125 
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Graph 5.1. Human rights PQ content: 
confessional parties 





Table 5.5 below shows the variation of confessional parties’ 
adherence to human rights when asking China-related PQs. It shows that, 
after the initial China Crisis Theory periods, human rights related PQs make 
up 75% to 87.5% of all the PQs that confessional parties ask. No significant 
changes can be seen from this data across the policy periods. Specifically, 
had confessional parties cared deeply for human rights policy, a significant 
spike would have been observed during the Moderated Futurism policy 
period during which Rosenthal aimed to diminish the importance of human 
rights in foreign policy. Yet no such variation is noticeable. 
 
 










Table 5.5. China-related PQs per time period 
  Confessional Parties 




China Crisis Theory I 0 (0) 1 (100) 
China Crisis Theory II 0 (0) 7 (100) 
Economic Wow Factor 
I 
7 (25) 21 (75) 
Moderated Futurism 3 (16.7) 15 (83.3) 
Economic Wow Factor 
II 
3 (12.5) 21 (87.5) 
Economic wow factor 
/ China Threat 
2 (20) 8 (80) 
Total  15 73 
 
The data shows that the influence of confessionalism on the 
likelihood of raising human rights PQs regarding China is almost entirely 
determined by constituency-oriented behaviour. This is because these PQs 
rarely touch upon the persecution of Uyghurs, or Tibetans, nor regarding 
organ harvesting practices, but are predominantly concerned with their own 
and their constituents’ religion: Christianity. Furthermore, when asking PQs 
they refer to a newspaper almost exclusively read by strictly religious 
Christians who are more likely to vote for them. Finally, these parties do not 
appear to significantly react to policies for their behaviour. 
This observation has an important implication. A considerable part 
of Chinese human rights debates in the Dutch parliament is not  the result 
of  actual human rights concerns, but the fact that China is not 
Christian enough. Confessional parties’ behaviour shows that their 
concerns are not with human rights directly, nor are they on the concept of 
religious freedom. Their reason for just focusing on the Chinese 
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government preventing the practice of Christianity is that confessional 
parties wish for a broader Christian influence. It is in essence a political 
effort to push the Dutch government into taking actions that would increase 
the spread of Christianity. It is the classical behaviour of the missionary 
which drives confessional party behaviour in regards to Chinese human 
rights. The fundamental rights of humans themselves are not their concern. 
This is ultimately the political value that human rights have in the Dutch 
parliament. It is but a tool utilized by Christian fundamentalists. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter contained the statistical analysis of party 
characteristics and the role that they play in explaining why some parties 
are more inclined to raise human rights related PQs than others. In 
particular, I was interested in whether or not confessional parties have their 
own particular reason for their high percentage of human rights PQs. 
Confessional parties have been shown to focus on human rights issues in 
China so much, not because of their adherence to human rights in general, 
but because confessional parties desire a more widespread influence of 
Christianity in China. These parties often reference newspapers aligned 
with highly religious affiliations, making this behaviour identifiable as 




Chapter 6. Government actions and party 
behaviour 
Chapter 5 showed that confessional parties have distinctly different reasons 
for their party behaviour than traditional opposition and coalition parties. 
They also showed, however, that traditional party behaviour theories could 
not explain the differences between opposition and coalition parties. This 
chapter is dedicated to analysing party behaviour as a reaction to its 
environment. The first part provides an overview of PQ trends over time. 
Through a qualitative content analysis the second part analyses periods of 
interests derived from part one. Finally, a conclusion is given in regards to 
the analysis’ meaning for party behaviour. 
6.1 Variations in PQs over time 
 Although the first PQs regarding China were asked from 1973, the 
yearly average of total China-related PQs remained less than 5 per year 
until 1997. Human rights issues did pick up the pace during the period of 
the first Economic Wow Factor policy, however, as Chart 5.1 shows, the 
largest influence can be seen in the period before the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. Human rights issues in China suddenly became increasingly 
relevant due to the indirect involvement that the Netherlands would play in 
it. Dutch athletes would make use of facilities created by bulldozing poor 
neighbourhoods to the ground. Opposition parties also called for a boycott 
of the opening ceremony in a public display of protest to the human rights 
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conditions in China. After the Olympics, however, human rights PQs 
dropped to nearly their prior level. 
 The amount of human rights PQs suddenly peaked again in 2011. 
This coincides with Uri Rosenthal’s attempt at diminishing the importance of 
human rights in international relations with China. It shows that parties 




 Fluctuations of the amount of PQs fluctuate heavily per year. This 
is likely because of variations in domestic policy rather than fluctuations in 
international relations or policy with China. However, tendencies can be 









































































































Figure 6.1 China-PQs 1973 - 2019 
Human Rights PQ Non-human rights PQ
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members contain an increasingly smaller share of the total human rights 
related PQs asked by parties. Both confessional parties and opposition 
parties have proportionately increased their share of human rights PQs. 
 
 It is not only in the proportion of human rights questions in which 
tendencies are shown. Table 5.3 shows the amount of PQs, both non-
human rights and human rights-oriented per period for confessional, 
opposition, and coalition parties each. 
Table 6.1 China-related PQs per party group per time period 
  Confessional 
Parties 
Opposition parties Coalition parties 

















































































































Total  15 73 203 164 184 102 
 
The data shows that confessionalism is not swayed much by the 
differences in policy approaches as the proportion of human rights 
questions they ask remains relatively even. Opposition parties, however, 
seem more swayed by government policies. In particular, the short cabinet 
period in which Minister of Foreign Affairs Uri Rosenthal tried to diminish 
the importance of human rights in foreign affairs stands out. It shows that 
opposition parties use parliamentary questions not merely for diminishing 
the information gap, but also to target policies that they do not agree upon. 
After the ‘moderated futurism’ period human rights questions remain on a 
similar level as before it. Coalition parties however, show a steady decline 
in the proportion of human rights questions asked. To some extent this can 
be explained by the fact that the foreign relations with China have become 
increasingly complex and multifaceted over the years, but it is a sharp 
decline from 58.3% during the 1989-1997 ‘China Crisis Theory II’ period 
down to a mere 8.9% during the current period of a combined ‘economic 
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wow factor’ and ‘China Threat theory’ approach. It shows that human rights 
are increasingly becoming an issue of contention done by the parties in 
opposition. As testimonial parties are also its distinct branch of the 
opposition, this is all the more true. During the last two periods coalition 
parties only raised human rights questions 11 times, compared to the 
combined total of 77 from the confessional and opposition parties. 
 The decrease of participation from coalition parties in debating the 
governments’ human rights policies is a trend resulting from the increasing 
complexities of China’s position vis-à-vis the Netherlands. As the plurality of 
considerations in the NL-China relationship increase, coalition parties will 
be more likely to focus their attention on one of the many other issues, 
aside from human rights. Because human rights have little value in 
electoral competition, there is limited value aside from moral duty to engage 
in discussion. This makes smaller parties increasingly important for 
checking the governments’ actions. Parties that are less concerned with 
‘winning’ elections have fewer incentives to ignore human rights than 
parties that aim to become part of a coalition. 
If opposition party behaviour is largely determined by external forces 
such as government policies or increased importance of China such as the 
Beijing Olympics, exactly how did parties act in such periods? The following 




6.2 Party behaviour in regards to the Olympics in Beijing 
 With the promise that the human rights situation in China would 
improve in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics, the country was awarded the 
sporting event.126 Wang Wei, Secretary General of the Olympic Committee 
of the Olympic Games in China (2008), stated, "We are convinced that the 
Games coming to China will not only promote our economy, but also 
improve all social conditions, including education, health and human 
rights."127 In the run-up to the Games however, human rights remained 
under constant tension and violations even increased in order to achieve 
the Games.128 In Dutch parliament, discussions regarding human rights 
violations in the run-up to the Olympics led to a special hearing on the 
matter in March 2008. 
 As shown in the data, an increase in PQs was observed during this 
period. The first PQ directly related to the Olympics was raised on the 16th 
of July 2007 and the last one on the 21st of August 2008. All PQs raised per 
party are shown in figure 6.3. 
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 The SGP and the CU raised predominantly PQs regarding human 
rights. Out of the 12 PQs raised, 9 were in regards to human rights and all 
9 of those concerned Christian rights. Only 2 of those questions were 
related to the Olympics and they were asked on whether or not the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs was aware of China sending away foreign missionaries in 
the run-up to the Olympics. This shows that the confessional parties did not 
react to the increased interest on China’s human rights situation during this 
time. 
 The coalition at the time existed of the CDA, PvdA and the CU. 
Contrary to expectations, the PvdA and CDA raised more human rights 
related PQs than non-human rights related PQs. Not only were the coalition 
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deviates from their overall balance of human rights and non-human rights 
PQs.129 Out of the total of 40 PQs of coalition parties, 27 were human-rights 
related. Of these 14 were specifically asked in the period of February to 
May 2008 in regards to whether or not the Netherlands would boycott the 
opening ceremony of the Olympics in response to the associated human 
rights issues. This shows that, although general tendencies show that 
coalition parties are less likely to focus on human rights PQs, this changes 
when government actions are uncertain. Especially the PvdA asked many 
PQs in regards to the potential boycott. As both the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs were part of CDA at the time, this shows that the 
PvdA used PQs to ascertain their coalition partner’s position on the matter. 
This coincides with the control tool theory as discussed in chapter 2.130 
 The opposition parties Groenlinks, D66, VVD, SP and PVV all 
showed increased amounts of PQs, but except for the PVV all asked more 
non-human rights related PQs than those related to human rights. With 25 
seats the SP is expected to be most active amongst the opposition parties, 
but the difference with the VVD is large even though the VVD had 22 seats. 
In comparison, Groenlinks was more active than its 7 seat size would 
suggest and the PVV and D66 with 9 and 3 seats respectively behaved 
more or less within their expectation of party size. The SP’s high activity 
can be explained by the fact that they are the de facto opposition party. In 
their 50 years of existence they have not once participated in a coalition 
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government, despite their party consistently placing between 3rd to 6th place 
in terms of number of seats. The VVD on the other hand, has only been in 
opposition three times in the same time period, whereas they have been 
part of the coalition government eleven times. 
 In terms of content, opposition parties asked both related and 
unrelated PQs. Greenleft was the only party to question whether or not the 
right of freedom of expression of Dutch athletes and their coaches could be 
protected in China. This was in reaction to a Dutch coach’s criticism to 
human rights violations during the preparations for the Olympics in China. 
However, the social freedoms of expression seemed core to the domestic 
debate. All opposition parties except for D66 asked PQs regarding arrests 
of civil rights activists. The culmination of these PQs came through 
multiparty PQs asking whether the government would consider boycotting 
the opening ceremony, signed by members of parties from both the 
coalition and the opposition, with exception of CU and PVV.131 As a result, 
a special hearing was held to discuss the issue, but the government held 
the position that human rights dialogues were more beneficial than being 
absent and chose to attend despite opposition.132 
6.3 Party behaviour during Uri Rosenthal’s policy changes 
 Uri Rosenthal’s statements regarding human rights not being on 
equal standards in foreign policy on the 11th of December 2010 immediately 
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led to questions by exactly what that meant for him in terms of policy. 
Figure 6.4 shows the PQs per party from the moment of Rosenthal’s first 
statement until the premature falling of the coalition. 
 The figure shows that, overall, parties were much more concerned 
with human rights at the time compared to other issues related to China. 
This is in contrast with the 2008 Olympics period. The reason for this is that 
the period of the 2008 Olympics were affected by the salience China 
received due to being the Olympics host country. It was not specifically 
human rights that were salient, but China as a whole. During Rosenthal’s 
time as Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, it was exactly the opposite. 
Human rights as its role in foreign policy was at the core of the discussion, 
which in extension led to PQs regarding human rights policy in the NL-












Figure 6.4 PQs per party from 2010-
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 The confessional parties raised a total of 17 PQs in this period, out 
of which 15 were human rights related. Of these 15 PQs, 12 were related to 
Christian rights specifically. Out of the 12 PQs that CU raised, 8 of them 
were regarding a group of Christian dissidents that were jailed and 
supposedly mistreated.133 None of the PQs were focused particularly on 
questioning the government’s stance on policy, except for one PQ by the 
SGP. This PQ was raised by the SGP’s Van der Staaij where he asked 
what Rosenthal’s human rights policy would entail after his comment on the 
11th of December 2010. He included a suggestion which stated that a 
theory called the ‘receptor approach’ might be of value. Van der Staaij 
followed up on this through a motion which asked for Rosenthal’s attention 
in evaluating the receptor approach when formulating his human rights 
policy letter.134 This shows that the SGP was the one who influenced a 
great deal of policy debate during this period. Why the SGP would try to 
influence human rights policy in this way became clear in the subsequent 
parliamentary debate a week later. One focus of the receptor approach was 
strengthening local, non-governmental institutions already existing in 
societies. When asked what communities Van der Staaij was thinking of, 
the answer was predictable: local Christian communities would form an 
excellent basis for Dutch human rights efforts through this approach.135 This 
was another way in which a confessional party could try to promote 
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Christianity abroad. This time, the effort was made by suggesting that 
development assistance towards Christian communities could become part 
of Dutch foreign policy. This coincides with the findings of the previous 
chapter which concluded that confessional parties’ behaviour was 
motivated by the desire to increase the influence of Christianity abroad. 
 The two parties that did not raise a single human rights related PQ 
were both of the coalition government parties, the VVD and the CDA. This 
is in contrast with the period surrounding the 2008 Olympics. The reason 
for this is that the VVD and CDA were both participants in formulating the 
government’s human rights policies; therefore they would have had fewer 
questions to the new policy formulations in comparison to the opposition 
parties. The PVV is an outlier in this case. The PVV was never official part 
of the coalition cabinet, but operated under a ‘tolerate’ understanding. The 
PVV would support the decision-making of the government but would not 
actively participate as coalition party. The PVV retracting their support 
caused the cabinet to fall prematurely. Thus, although in a ‘semi’-coalition 
party position, they behaved dissimilar to the other coalition parties, as they 
had no part in policy formulations. 
 The opposition parties D66, PvdA, and SP all focused heavily on 
human rights in their PQs. The lack of behaviour from Groenlinks is note-
worthy as they were one of the most active parties during the 2008 
Olympics’ debates. Possibly this is because of internal strive during this 
period that caused multiple changes in party leadership, but other than that 
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no specific reason can be ascertained. Of the 29 human rights PQs raised 
by these opposition parties, 12 of them related specifically to government 
policy. This included multiple PQs that criticized Rosenthal’s decision to 
postpone the ‘Human Rights Tulip’ prize to a Chinese lawyer who fought for 
the rights of Chinese citizens that lost their homes during the 2008 
Olympics. 136   The activities by the opposition parties show that they 
respond critically to government policies. This behaviour is dissimilar to 
coalition parties and those adhering to confessional politics. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter aimed to analyse differences amongst parties in their 
behaviour in regards to asking China-related PQs. It was found that 
confessional parties do not respond much to external changes, with the 
exception of the SGP’s attempt at influencing foreign policy to strengthen 
the position of Christian communities in countries with human rights issues. 
Coalition parties were shown to only respond heavily when their 
government’s positions on matters are unclear. However, when political 
debates arise by opposition parties due to prior agreed upon policies, 
coalition parties do not raise more PQs themselves. Finally, opposition 
parties react differently depending on external situations. During the 2008 
Olympics, China became more important in political debates, but it did not 
necessarily create a proportionately larger interest in Chinese human rights. 
However, Rosenthal’s policy changes caused opposition parties to focus 
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more on Chinese human rights than ever, even though China’s salience did 
not increase. It was only due to the increased perceived importance of 
questioning the government’s human rights policies.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an 
inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. 
Whatever affects one directly, affects all directly.” – Martin Luther King. 
In 2013, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans, 
started with this quotation when presenting his human rights policy letter to 
parliament. 137  The document was meant to re-emphasize the Dutch 
‘tradition’ of human rights advocacy after the previous cabinet aimed to 
diminish human rights as a goal in foreign policy. Yet, human rights as a 
topic in international relations changes as the political environments change 
as well. The China-policy letter presented in 2019 introduced the new 
concern of a worldwide decreasing human rights situation due to increasing 
Chinese influence. The notion that the Netherlands has a culture of human 
rights advocacy assumes certain uniformity in norms and values in politics. 
This study aimed to test this assumption by looking at party level variations 
in regards to their adherence to human rights in parliamentary debates 
regarding China. It aimed to do so through the research question What 
causes some Dutch parties to focus more on human rights issues in the 
Netherlands-China relations than others? Furthermore, through an analysis 
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of party level characteristics can human rights be considered any different 
from other topics pertaining international relations with China?  
The research objective was embedded in party behaviour theories 
regarding parliamentary questions. Human rights were found to have no 
electoral value for parties as it is not a topic for contention during elections. 
Control theory did not have significant influence on a party’s adherence to 
human rights issues. This shows that conceptualizations of proper human 
rights policies are not the result of overall ideological stances. The results, 
however, did show that some parties behave distinctly different from others. 
Coalition parties are less and less concerned with human rights during the 
same period as the importance of economic relations with China has been 
increasing. This has left opposition parties to pressure the government for 
their adherence to human rights policies. Yet, not all opposition parties 
were found to behave the same. The smaller parties adhering to Christian 
fundamentalism focused on human rights to a much greater extent than 
any other party. However, this was not shown to be out of altruism, but 
because it was used as a constituency oriented-tool for expanding Christian 
influences abroad. Human rights therefore have high political value for 
these small confessional parties. Effectively these parties aim to act as an 
indirect missionary, trying to expand adherence to the Christian faith. 
Different party groups also behave dissimilar during periods of 
increased salience. Confessional parties are shown to not respond much to 
changes in international issues such as the 2008 Olympics, nor to domestic 
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changes such as human rights policy changes. The motivation for their 
behaviour here is that of increasing Christian influences abroad, which 
coincides with the analysis of party characteristics. Opposition parties were 
shown to respond heavily to both domestic and foreign influences. 
Increased importance of China resulted in increased PQs overall, but not 
proportionately more for human rights. Changes in Dutch human rights 
policy did cause opposition parties to focus more on Chinese human rights. 
Finally, coalition parties react mostly in times where behaviour of coalition 
partners is uncertain, which is in line with control tool theory. 
The results of this study have several implications. Party behaviour 
theories may not apply to all political topics. This shows the need for a 
further understanding of what determines party behaviour beyond general 
tendencies. Furthermore, the large variations amongst parties shown in the 
analysis show that the Netherlands should not be simply considered a 
unitary human rights advocate at the state level. There are party level 
influences at play that determine policy debates and formulations. 
Furthermore, the domestic human rights debate is disproportionately 
carried by small parties that adhere to strict biblical guidelines. 
 For future research it is worth investigating whether the roles of 
confessional and opposition parties change when engaging other human 
rights abusing countries. Conversely, it is worth investigating whether 
similar party behaviours are at play in the engagements with China of other 
human rights advocates such as Denmark and Sweden. However, it should 
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be noted that neither of these countries have as deep as economic ties to 
China as the Netherlands, making the balancing between human rights and 





Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV), (2012), ‘The receptor 
approach. A question of weight and measure’, 1-15. 
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV), (2013), ‘Azië in 
opmars. Strategische betekenis en gevolgen’, 1–67. (transl.: “Advisory-
council International Issues, ‘Asia on the Rise, Strategic meaning and 
implications’.”). 
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV), (2017), ‘De Wil van 
het volk? De Erosie van de Democratische Rechtsstaat in Europa’, 1-86. 
(transl.: “The will of the people? Erosion of the democratic constitutional 
state in Europe.”). 
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV), (2019), ‘China en de 
strategische opdracht voor Nederland in Europa’, 1-117. (transl.: “China 
and the strategic mission for the Netherlands in Europe.”). 
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV), (2019), ‘Duurzame 
ontwikkelingsdoelen en mensenrechten. Een noodzakelijk verbond.’, 1-82. 




Agnew, John, (2012), ‘Looking back to look forward: Chinese 
geopolitical narratives and China’s past’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 53(3), 301–314. 
Alemán, Eduardo, Ernesto Calvo, Mark. P. Jones, and Noah Kaplan 
(2009). ‘Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll-Call Ideal Points’, Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 34:1, 87–116. 
Andeweg, R. B. (2000). Ministers as double agents? The delegation 
process between cabinet and ministers. European Journal of Political 
Research, 37(3), 377-395. 
Bakker, R., De Vries, C., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, 
G., ... & Vachudova, M. A. (2015). Measuring party positions in Europe: 
The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics, 21(1), 
143-152. 
Baehr, Peter R., M. Castermans, and Fred Grünfeld, (2002), 
‘Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands’, Intersentia, 
Amsterdam. 
Bailer, Stefanie (2011). ‘People’s Voice or Information Pool? The 
Role of, and Reasons for, Parliamentary Questions in the Swiss Parliament’, 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 17:3, 302–314. 
Barr, Michael, D., (2011), ‘Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of 
Chinese Soft Power’, Zed Books Ltd, London. 
99 
 
Bateson, Gregory. “Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays 
in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology.” University Of 
Chicago Press, 1972. ISBN 0-226-03905-6. 
Brady, Anne-Marie, (2009), ‘Mass persuasion as a means of 
legitimation and China’s popular authoritarianism’, American Behavioral 
Scientist, 53(3), 434–457. 
Baumgartner, F. R., Jones, B. D., & Leech, B. L. “Media attention 
and congressional agendas.” In S. Iyengar & R. Reeves (Eds.), “Do the 
Media govern? Politicians, voters, and reporters in America”. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE. (1997): 349-363. 
Bonafont, L. C., & Baumgartner, F. R. “Newspaper attention and 
policy activities in Spain. Journal of Public Policy, 33(1) (2013): 65-88. 
Bräuninger, Thomas, Martin Brunner, and Thomas Däubler (2012). 
‘Personal vote-seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives 
shape Belgian MPs’ bill initiation behaviour’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 51:5, 607–645. 
Broomfield, E.V., (2003), ‘Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat 
Theory’, Journal of Contemporary China, 35, 265–284. 
Carroll, Royce, and Gary W. Cox (2012). ‘Shadowing Ministers. 
Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 45:2, 220–36. 
100 
 
Castermans-Holleman, M. C. (1992). Het Nederlands 
mensenrechtenbeleid in de Verenigde Naties. TMC Asser Instituut. 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek – CBS. Thomassen, J., (primary 
investigator); (): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 1994. DANS. 
https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-27g-npxj.  
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek - CBS. ‘Stemgedrag 
stemgerechtigden Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 12-09-2012: Kerkelijke 
Gezindte’. Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS). https://www.cbs.nl/nl-
nl/cijfers/detail/82095NED Accessed: 12-4-2020. (transl. “Voting behaviour 
of voters’ house of parliaments’ election 12-09-2012: religious affiliation”.) 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek – CBS; Stichting 
Kiezersonderzoek Nederland – SKON; Irwin, Prof.dr. G.A. (Universiteit 
Leiden, Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen); Holsteyn, Prof.dr. J.J.M. van 
(Universiteit Leiden, Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen); Ridder, Drs. J.M. 
den (Universiteit Leiden, Vakgroep Politieke 
Wetenschappen) (2003): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 2002 2003. 
DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zk3-7d56.  
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek - CBS; Stichting 
Kiezersonderzoek Nederland - SKON; Martha Brinkman - Universiteit 
Twente; Kolk, Dr. H. van der (Universiteit Twente); Aarts, Prof.dr. C.W.A.M. 
(Universiteit Twente); Rosema, Dr. M. (Universiteit 
101 
 
Twente) (2007): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 2006. DANS. 
https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x7h-hmh5. 
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). ‘Framing theory.’ Annu. Rev. 
Polit. Sci., 10, 103-126. 
Ciftci, Sabri, and Tevfik M. Yildirim, (2019), ‘Hiding behind the party 
brand or currying favour with constituents: Why do representatives engage 
in different types of constituency-oriented behavior?’ Party Politics, 25(3), 
369–381. 
Denemark, D. (2000) Partisan pork barrel in parliamentary systems: 
Australian constituency-level grants. Journal of Politics 62(3): 896–915. 
Donders, Y. M., and V. Vleugel, ‘The Receptor Approach: a New 
Human Rights Kid on the Block or Old Wine in New Bags?: A Commentary 
on Professor Zwart’s Article in HRQ’, Interfaces Research Paper 04-25 
(2013). 
Edwards, G. C. E., & Wood, B. D. “Who influences whom? The 
president, congress, and the media.” The American Political Science 
Review, 93(2) (1999): 327-344. 
Flinterman C., en J. Krommendijk, ‘En Wie komt er dan op voor Liu 
Xiaobo?, in NRC Handelsblad (13 April 2012). 
Fukuyama, Francis, (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, 
Free Press, London. 
102 
 
Green-Pedersen, C., & Stubager, R. “The political conditionality of 
mass media influence: when do parties follow mass media attention?” 
British Journal of Political Science, 40(3) (2010): 663-677. 
Guthrie, Doug, (2012), ‘China and globalisation: the social, 
economic and political transformation of Chinese society’, Routledge, 
London. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 1978-
1979, Appendix. 15571, nr. 2. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 1986-
1987, Appendix. 19700, Ch. V, nr. 91. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 1988-
1989, ‘de verklaring van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken inzake 
recente gebeurtenissen in China’, nr. 83. (transl. “the statement of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding recent events in China”). 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 1990-
1991, Appendix. 21800, Ch. 5, nr. 91. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 1996-
1997, Appendix. 25300, Ch. 5, nr. 1-3. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2000-
2001, Appendix. 27742, nr. 1. 
103 
 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2007-
2008, Appendix. 31263, nr. 1. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2010-
2011, Appendix. 32500, Ch. 5, nr. 35, 91. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2010-
2011, Appendix. 32735, nr. 1, 19. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2010-
2011, Appendix. 32735. ‘debat naar aanleiding van een algemeen overleg 
op 14 juni 2011 over mensenrechten en vrijheid van godsdienst en 
meningsuiting’. (transl. “debate in response to a general consultation on the 
14th of June, 2011 regarding human rights and the freedom of religion and 
speech”) 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2011-
2012. Appendix. 32735, nr. 29, 48, 51, and 68. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2011-
2012. Appendix. 33000, Ch. 5, nr. 120. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2011-
2012, Appendix. 33240, Ch. 5, nr. 1. 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2012-
2013, Appendix. 32735, nr. 78. 
104 
 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (HTK; Parliamentary piece), 2017-
2018, Appendix. 32735, nr. 198. 
Hansen, K.M., and R.T. Pedersen (2008). ‘Negative Campaigning in 
a Multiparty System’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 31:4, 408–27. 
Höhmann, Daniel and Ulrich Sieberer (2020). ‘Parliamentary 
questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments, West 
European Politics, 43:1, 225–249 . 
Hsieh H., and Sarah E. Shannon “Three Approaches to Qualitative 
Content Analysis”. Qualitative Health Research, 2005, 15; 1277-1288. 
Hughes, C. R., (2006), ‘Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era’, 
Politics in Asia Series, Routledge, London. 
Hughes, C. R., (2013), ‘Taiwan and Chinese nationalism: national 
identity and status in international society’, Routledge, London. 
Human Rights Watch, (2018), World Report. United States. 
Ikenberry, G. J., (1999), ‘Why Export Democracy?’, The Wilson 
Quarterly, 23, 56–66. 
Ikenberry, G. J., (2008), ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the 
West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs, 87, 23–37. 
Jacques, M., (2009), When China Rules the World: The Rise of the 
Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World. Penguin, London. 
105 
 
Jenco, Leigh, (2013), ‘Revisiting Asian Values’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 74:2, 237–258. 
Keh, Julia F. (2015). ‘The Centralisation of Parliamentary Policy 
Statements in Western European Parliaments’, West European Politics, 
38:5, 1086–1105. 
Kellermann, Michael (2016). ‘Electoral Vulnerability, Constituency 
Focus, and Parliamentary Questions in the House of Commons’, The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(1), 90–106. 
Kerevel YP (2015) Pork-barreling without reelection? Evidence from 
the Mexican congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(1): 137–166. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social 
inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton university 
press. 
Kinzelbach, Katrin, (2012), ‘An Analysis of China’s Statements on 
Human Rights at the United Nations (2000-2010)’, Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, 30:3, 299–332. 
Lancaster TD (1986) Electoral structures and pork barrel politics. 
International Political Science Review 7(1): 67–81. 
Louwerse, Tom and Simon Otjes (2016). ‘Personalised 
parliamentary behaviour without electoral incentives: the case of the 
Netherlands’, West European Politics, 39:4, 778–799. 
106 
 
Lower House of the States General. Rules of Procedure. “Chapter 
XI. Requests to the government for information”. 
https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/180626
-reglement_van_orde_engels.pdf. Accessed 24-5-2020. 
Lower House of The States General. ‘Zo werkt de Tweede Kamer’. 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/zo-werkt-de-kamer. Accessed: 12-4-2020. 
Mahbubani, K., (2008), ‘The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible 
Shift of Global Power to the East’, Hachette UK, London. 
Malcontent, P.A.M., (1998), ‘Op kruistocht in de derde wereld: de 
reactie van de Nederlandse regering op ernstige en stelselmatige 
schendingen van fundamentele mensenrechten in ontwikkelingslanden 
1973 – 1981’, Hilversum. 
Malcontent, P.A.M. en Huijboom, A., (2006), ‘De Nederlandse inzet 
in de VN-Commissie voor de Rechten van de mens’, Den Haag. 
Maniou, T. A., & Bantimaroudis, P. (2018). Hybrid salience: 
Examining the role of traditional and digital media in the rise of the Greek 
radical left. Journalism, 1464884918796587. 
Martin, Jacques. When China rules the world: The end of the 
western world and the birth of a new global order. Penguin, 2009. 
107 
 
Martin, Shane, (2011). ‘Parliamentary Questions, the Behaviour of 
Legislators, and the Function of Legislatures: An Introduction’, Journal of 
Legislative Studies, 17:3, 259 – 270. 
Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2011). ‘Parliaments and 
Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mayring, Philipp. “Qualitative content analysis.” A companion to 
qualitative research 1 (2004): 159-176. 
McCombs, M., & Reynolds, A. “News influence on our pictures of 
the world”. Media Effects. Routledge, 2002, 11-28. 
McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. "The agenda-setting 
function of mass media." Public opinion quarterly 36.2 (1972): 176-187. 
Mearsheimer, J. J., (2005), ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, Current 
History, 105, 160-162. 
Meer, prof. dr. T.W.G. van der; Kolk, dr. H. van der; Rekker, dr. 
R. (2017): Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2017 (DPES/NKO 
2017). DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xby-5dhs. 
Muller, Wim, (2013), ‘China’s sovereignty in international law: from 
historical grievance to pragmatic tool’, China-EU Law Journal, 1.3:4, 35–59. 
108 
 
Norton, P., (1993), ‘Introduction: Parliament since 1960. In: M. 
Franklin and P. Norton, eds. Parliamentary Questions. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Obbema, F., (2013), ‘China en Europa: waar twee werelden elkaar 
raken’, Amsterdam. (transl. “China and Europe: where two worlds meet”.) 
Otjes, Simon and Tom Louwerse, (2018), ‘Parliamentary questions 
as strategic party tools’, West European Politics, 41:2, 496–516. 
Ramo, J. C., (2004), ‘The Beijing Consensus’, The Foreign Policy 
Centre, 1–74. 
H. Reiding, (2008), ‘Naar een menswaardig bestaan?: nieuwe 
mensenrechtenstrategie minister Verhagen’, Internationale spectator, 62:4: 
208-213. 
Rijksoverheid. ‘Nederland-China: een Nieuw Balans’. Minister Blok 
(BZ). 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/05/15/nederland-
china-een-nieuwe-balans. Accessed November 21, 2019. (transl. 
“Netherlands-China: a new balance”) 
Rijksoverheid. ‘Toespraak Minister Blok over de Chinastrategie van 
het kabinet’. Minister Blok (BZ). https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-
/toespraken/2019/05/15/toespraak-minister-blok-over-de-chinastrategie-
van-het-kabinet. Accessed November 21, 2019. (transl. “Speech Minister 
Blok regarding the China-strategy of the cabinet”) 
109 
 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, 
(1999), ‘The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. In: 
Freeman, Michael, (2017), ‘Human rights’, John Wiley & Sons. 
Roessingh, Martijn. ‘Minister distantieert zich van eigen 
mensenrechtenprijs’. https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/rosenthal-distantieert-
zich-van-eigen-mensenrechtenprijs~b35d971f/ . Accessed: 20 May, 2020. 
Roggeband, C., & Vliegenthart, R. (2007). Divergent framing: The 
public debate on migration in the Dutch parliament and media, 1995–
2004. West European Politics, 30(3), 524-548. 
Russo, Federico, and Matti Wiberg (2010). ‘Parliamentary 
Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps towards 
Comparison’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 16:2, 215–232. 
Saalfeld, Thomas (2011). ‘Parliamentary Questions as Instruments 
of Substantive Representation: Visible Minorities in the UK House of 
Commons, 2005-10’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 17:3, 354–367. 
Sevenans, J., & Vliegenthart R. “Political Agenda-Setting in Belgium 
and the Netherlands: The Moderating Role of Conflict Framing.” Journalism 
and Mass Communication Quarterly. Vol 93(1) (2016): 187-203. 
Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of 
political argument and the logic of issue framing. Studies in public opinion: 
Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change, 133-65. 
110 
 
Soroka S, Penner E and Blidook K (2009) Constituency influence in 
parliament. Canadian Journal of Political Science 42(3): 563–591. 
Spence, J.D., (1998), ‘The Khan’s Great Continent: China in 
Western Minds, New York. 
States General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. . 
“Mensenrechtenrapportage 2018: Inzet en resultaten buitenlands 
mensenrechtenbeleid” 2018: 1- 105. 
States General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Nederland-China: Een 
Nieuw Balans’. 2019: 1-105. 
Stichting Kiezersonderzoek Nederland – SKON; Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek - CBS; Kolk, Dr. H.; Aarts, Prof.dr. C.W.A.M.; Tillie, 
Prof.dr. J.N. (2012): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 2010 – NKO 2010. DANS. 
https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xvh-tghy.  
Strøm K (1997) ‘Rules, reasons and routines: legislative roles in 
parliamentary democracies.’ Journal of Legislative Studies 3(1): 155–174. 
Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary 
democracies. European journal of political research, 37(3), 261-290. 
Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (2008). Cabinets and 




Tavits, M. (2009), ‘The making of mavericks: local loyalties and 
party defection.’ Comparative Political Studies 42(6): 793–815. 
The Royal House. ‘Toespraak van Zijne Majesteit de Koning at the 





Thesen, G. “When good news is scarce and bad news is good: 
Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda-
setting.” European Journal of Political Research, 52(3) (2013): 364-389. 
Thies, M. F. (2001). Keeping tabs on partners: The logic of 
delegation in coalition governments. American Journal of Political Science, 
580-598. 
United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/human-rights/. Accessed: 24-5-2020. 
Van Aelst, Peter, and Rens Vliegenthart. ‘Studying the tango: An 
analysis of parliamentary questions and press coverage in the Netherlands.’ 
Journalism Studies 15(4), 392–410. 
Van der Pas, D. “Making Hay While the Sun Shines: Do Parties 
Only Respond to Media Attention When The Framing is Right?”. Journal of 
Press/Politics. 19 (1) (2014): 42-65. 
112 
 
Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M., and Rudy B. Andeweg (2012). ‘Tweede 
Orde Personalisering: Voorkeurstemmen in Nederland’, Res Publica, 54:2, 
163–191. 
Vanhoonacker, Sophie, and Karolina Pomorska. "The European 
External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign 
policy." Journal of European Public Policy 20.9 (2013): 1316-1331. 
Van Noije, L., Kleinnijenhuis, J., & Oegema, D. “Loss of 
parliamentary control due to mediatization and Europeanization: a 
longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of agenda building in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. British Journal of Political Science, 38(3) 
(2014): 455-478. 
Vliegenthart, R., S. Walgrave, and B. Zicha (2013). ‘How 
Preferences, Information and Institutions Interactively Drive Agenda-Setting: 
Questions in the Belgian Parliament, 1993-2000’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 52:3, 390–418. 
Vogel, E. F., (2011), ‘Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of 
China’, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Walgrave, S., Soroka, S., & Nuytemans, M. “ The mass media’s 
political agenda-setting power a longitudinal analysis of media, parliament 
and government in Belgium (1993 to 2000). Comparative Political Studies, 
41(6) (2008): 814-836. 
113 
 
Walter, A.S. (2014). ‘Choosing the Enemy: Attack Behaviour in a 
Multiparty System’, Party Politics, 20:3, 311–23. 
Werkgroep nationaal kiezersonderzoek (primary 
investigator); (): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 
1971. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x3j-3a4m. 
Werkgroep nationaal kiezersonderzoek (primary 
investigator); (): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 
1981. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-228-8svu. 
Werkgroep nationaal kiezersonderzoek (primary 
investigator); (): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 
1977. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x5x-pvkr.  
Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (primary 
investigator); (): Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 
1982. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x5n-xqkf.  
World Trade Organization. “China and the WTO”. 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm Accessed: 
25-5-2020. 
Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen. “Why Does the WHO Exclude 
Taiwan.” Council of Foreign Affairs. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-does-
who-exclude-taiwan. Accessed: 25-5-2020. 
114 
 
Zakaria, F., (2013), ‘An Interview with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign 
Affairs, 73:2. 
Zhao, D. (2009). ‘The Mandate of Heaven and Performance 
Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China’, American Behavioral 





Table 1. Amount of PQs per party 
  











CDA 81 45 126 
CU 6 26 32 
D66 30 19 49 
DENK 0 12 12 
DS'70 0 1 1 
Groenlinks 32 24 56 
Independent 3 0 3 
LPF 0 1 1 
Multiparty 3 25 28 
PPR 5 0 5 
PSP 1 0 1 
PvdA 44 50 94 
PvdD 35 0 35 
PVV 29 27 56 
RPF 0 5 5 
SGP 9 27 36 
SP 75 61 136 
VVD 84 13 97 
Total 437 336 773 
 
Table 2. List of all effective parties in the Lower House from 1973 
  
Characteristics 
Ideology Time Period 
Party CDA Christian Democracy 1980 – current 
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CU Testimonial Conservatism 2000 – current 
D66 Social Liberalism 1966 – current 
DENK Immigration Politics 2016 – current 
DS'70 Social Liberalism 1970 – 1983 
Groenlinks Green Socialism 1989 – current 
LPF Populist Nationalism 1999 – 2007 
PPR Green Politics 1968 – 1991 
PSP Pacifist Socialism 1957 – 1991 
PvdA Labour Party 1946 – current 
PvdD Animal Rights 2002 – current 
PVV Populist Nationalism 2006 – current 
RPF Testimonial Conservatism 1975 – 2001 
SGP Testimonial Conservatism 1918 – current 
SP Democratic Socialism 1971 – current 
VVD Conservative Liberalism 1948 – current 
 
Table 3. China’s rise theories and human rights policies 




This theory predicts 
the demise of the 
Chinese state. It 
assumes that the 
regime of the CCP is 
doomed to fail as 
communism is a form 
of government that 
the Chinese people do 
not support. It was 
particularly prevalent 
after the Tiananmen 
Square Incident. 
As the CCP is expected to 
fail, human rights 
concerns are raised as 
critique on the Chinese 
state in order to weaken 
its position in the hopes 
of increasing the chance 
of instigating a movement 
for a regime change. 
Economic 
Wow Factor 
This theory assumes 
that China is not 
As interaction leads to 









different from the 
West. Increased 
economic and social 
interaction with China 
would lead to Chinese 
society to naturally 
change towards more 
Western ideals. This 
assumes that the 
capitalist-democratic 
ideology will spread 
around the world and 
countries such as 
China will slowly 
implement themselves 
into this existing 
framework. 
Western, the human 
rights situation is also 
expected to improve. 
Economic, diplomatic, 
and social interaction and 
cooperation are 
encouraged as they are 
predicted to have a 
Westernizing effect on 









According to this 
theory, China is the 
same as any other 
state as seen through 
the realism approach. 
Here, China as an actor 
will act according to its 
desire to increase its 
power. In US-China 
relations this is often 
framed as preventing 
each other’s influence 
in various regions of 
the world. 
The human rights 
situation in China can 
only be improved if the 
CCP believes it leads to 
more power for China. 
Thus, human rights are 
used as a weapon or 
bargaining tool in topics 








This theory assumes 
that China is a 
fundamentally 
different society than 
the West. Thus, as 
China increases its 
economic and 
diplomatic interactions 
with the West, it will 
not become more 
similar to Western 
Human rights issues in 
China are seen as a 
domestic issue to be 
handled by China alone 
out of respect for 
sovereignty. As China is 
considered a 
fundamentally different 
society, human rights 
dialogues are not 
expected to have any 
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states. In this case, 
neither the West nor 
China will be 








According to this 
theory, China is a 
fundamentally 
different society than 
the West and will 
become the future 
hegemon. Any increase 
in Chinese influence in 
world politics will lead 
to a world system 
more favourable to 
China. Here, in order 
for the West to 
preserve the current 
system, any increase of 
Chinese influence must 
be prevented. 
As China’s influence 
increases, it leads to a 
natural decline in the 
global human rights 
situation. As such, 
increases of China’s 
influence must be 
prevented in order for the 
Western ideals of human 
rights to remain. This 
theory is not widespread 
in Western academics. 
Source: existing academic theories and their arguments compiled by 
researcher. 
 
Table 4. GAL/TAN scores per party per survey year 
        
  1973-1997 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2017 


























GPV 8.636 8.636 - - - - - 
RPF 8.545 8.545 - - - - - 




LPF - - 5.440     
















DENK - - - - - - 6.364 
FvD - - - - - - 7.133 
 
Table 5. Electoral overlap per party per cabinet 
 











D66 CDA LPF VVD 
D6
6 






.259 .112 .052 .091 
.17
7 






.010 - - - - 






.007 - - - - 






.012 - - - - 






.011 .039 .030 .014 
.01
1 






.137 - .146 .224 
.10
1 






.213 .070 .035 .044 
.18
0 






- .101 .065 .121 - 
120 
 
VVD .069 .188 .114 - .210 .192 - .182 .224 .173 - 
.12
1 
PPR .144 .022 - - - - - - - - - - 
SP - - - - - .150 
.06
4 




Table 5. Electoral overlap per party per cabinet continued 
 
  2006 2010 2012 2017 
  CDA VVD PvdA VVD CDA PVV VVD PvdA VVD CDA D66 CU 
PvdA .111 .084 - .139 .139 - .155 - .110 .099 .173 .076 
SGP  .054 .030 .016 .053 .053 - .036 .024 .051 .078 .039 .141 
CDA  .047 .217 .111 .215 - - .185 .109 .188 - .144 .147 
GL .059 .039 .214 .093 .083 - .067 .182 .070 .070 .199 .091 
D66  .217 .075 .109 .185 .134 - .201 .192 .176 .144 - .082 
VVD - - .084 - .215 - - .155 - .188 .176 .070 
SP .065 .052 .233 .086 .078 - .088 .252 .050 .076 .111 .065 
PVV .051 .068 .047 .162 .094 - .142 .064 .101 .079 .041 .061 







국제인권선언이 제정된 지 70 여 년이 지났지만 인권은 여전히 국가간 관계에 
있어 중요한 갈등의 요소로 남아있다. 모든 국가는 대외 정책에 있어 인권의 
준수라는 이상과 경제적인 이익이라는 현실 사이의 절충점을 찾기 위해 
노력하고 있다. 전통적인 인권 웅호국으로서 네덜란드는 대외 정책의 수립과 
집행에 있어 인권과 경제적인 이익을 적절히 조율하지 못할 경우 어떠한 상황에 
처할 수 있는지 보여주는 대표적인 예이다. 네덜란드는 1990 년대 중국의 인권 
문제에 대한 지적으로 인해 경제적인 제재를 받았다. 본 논문은 중국의 인권 
문제에 대한 네덜란드의 입장 변화를 사례로 삼는다. 특히 본 논문은 인권 
문제와 경제적인 이익에 대한 개별 정당의 입장이 상이하다는 사실에 주목해 
이의 원인을 파악하고자 한다. 본 논문은 첫째, 중국 관련 문제를 제기함에 있어 
인권 문제에 대한 정당 간의 차이가 왜 발생하는지 분석하고자 한다. 둘째, 본 
논문은 네덜란드의 중국 인권에 대한 정책의 변화에 각 정당이 어떻게 다르게 
대웅하는지 분석하고자 한다. 본 논문은 이를 위해 의회 질의(PQ)와 연관된 
정당 행동에 관한 이론을 검토하고, 이를 통해 각 정당이 중국의 인권 문제에 
대해 다른 입장과 견해를 보이는 이유를 밝히고자 한다. 구체적으로, 기독교 
정당은 중국 인권 문제를 정치적인 도구로 활용해 왔다. 중국과의 관계가 
복잡해지고 다각화되면서 네덜란드 연립 정당은 인권 문제를 경제적인 이해 
관계 속에서 다루고자 했다. 마지막으로, 야당은 연립 정부가 중첨적으로 
추진하는 정책과 그에 따른 인권 정책의 변화에 민감하게 반응하는 것으로 
나타났다.  
 
주요어: 의회 질의, 인권, 정당 행동, 네덜란드 하원, 중국 
